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Glossary
The entries in this glossary are adapted from definitions 
provided by authoritative sources, such as the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Additionality A criterion sometimes applied to projects 
aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. It stipulates 
that the emission reductions accomplished by the project 
would not have happened anyway had the project not 
taken place.
Aerosols Airborne solid or liquid particles, with a typical size 
of between 0.01 and 10 micrometer (a millionth of a meter) 
that reside in the atmosphere for at least several hours. They 
may influence the climate directly through scattering and 
absorbing radiation, and indirectly by modifying the optical 
properties and lifetime of clouds.
Agroforestry Farming management practice characterized 
by the deliberate inclusion of woody perennials on 
farms, which usually leads to significant economic and/or 
ecological benefits between woody and non-woody system 
components. In most documented cases of successful 
agroforestry, tree-based systems are more productive, more 
sustainable and more attuned to people’s cultural or material 
needs than treeless alternatives. Agroforestry also provides 
significant mitigation benefits by sequestering carbon from 
the atmosphere in the tree biomass.
Annex I countries The industrialised countries (and those 
in transition to a market economy) that took on obligations 
to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Biomass plus carbon capture and storage (BioCCS) Use 
of energy produced from biomass where the combustion 
gases are then captured and stored underground or used, 
for example, in industrial processes. Gases generated 
through, for example, a fermentation process (as opposed 
to combustion) can also be captured.
Black carbon The substance formed through the incomplete 
combustion of fossil fuels, biofuels, and biomass, which is 
emitted in both anthropogenic and naturally occurring soot. 
It consists of pure carbon in several linked forms. Black 
carbon warms the Earth by absorbing heat in the atmosphere 
and by reducing albedo, the ability to reflect sunlight, when 
deposited on snow and ice.
Bottom-up model In the context of this report, a model that 
represents a system by looking at its detailed underlying 
parts. For example, a bottom-up model of emissions would 
compute the various sources of emissions, sector-by-sector, 
and then add these components together to get a total 
emissions estimate. 
Business-as-usual In the context of this report, a scenario 
used for projections of future emissions that assumes that 
no new action will be taken to mitigate emissions.
Carbon credits Tradable permits which aim to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by giving them a monetary value.
Carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) A simplified way to place 
emissions of various radiative forcing agents on a common 
footing by accounting for their effect on climate. It describes, 
for a given mixture and amount of greenhouse gases, the 
amount of carbon dioxide that would have the same global 
warming ability, when measured over a specified time 
period. For the purpose of this report, greenhouse gas 
emissions (unless otherwise specified) are the sum of the 
basket of greenhouse gases listed in Annex A of the Kyoto 
Protocol, expressed as carbon dioxide equivalents assuming 
a 100-year global warming potential.
Carbon leakage The increase in greenhouse gas emissions 
occurring outside countries taking domestic mitigation 
action.
Conditional pledge Pledges made by some countries that 
are contingent on the ability of national legislatures to enact 
the necessary laws, ambitious action from other countries, 
realization of finance and technical support, or other factors.
Double counting In the context of this report, double coun-
ting refers to a situation in which the same emission reductions 
are counted towards meeting two countries’ pledges.
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Emission pathway The trajectory of annual global 
greenhouse gas emissions over time.
Greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol These 
include the six main greenhouse gases, as listed in 
Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol: carbon dioxide (CO
2
); methane 
(CH
4
); nitrous oxide (N
2
O); hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs); 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs); and sulphur hexafluoride (SF
6
).
Integrated assessment models Models that seek to combine 
knowledge from multiple disciplines in the form of equations 
and/or algorithms in order to explore complex environmental 
problems. As such, they describe the full chain of climate 
change, including relevant links and feedbacks between 
socio-economic and biophysical processes.
International cooperative initiatives Initiatives outside 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change aimed at reducing emissions of greenhouse gases 
by promoting actions that are less greenhouse gas intensive, 
compared to prevailing alternatives.
Kyoto Protocol The international environmental treaty 
intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It builds 
upon the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change.
Later-action scenarios Climate change mitigation scenarios 
in which emission levels in the near term, typically up to 
2020 or 2030, are higher than those in the corresponding 
least-cost scenarios.
Least-cost scenarios Climate change mitigation scenarios 
assuming that emission reductions start immediately after 
the model base year, typically 2010, and are distributed 
optimally over time, such that aggregate costs of reaching 
the climate target are minimized.
Lenient rules Pledge cases with maximum Annex I land use, 
land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) credits and surplus 
emissions units, and maximum impact of double counting.
Likely chance A likelihood greater than 66 percent. Used 
in this report to convey the probabilities of meeting 
temperature limits.
Medium chance A likelihood of 50–66 percent. Used in this 
report to convey the probabilities of meeting temperature 
limits.
Montreal Protocol The Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer is an international treaty that 
was designed to reduce the production and consumption 
of ozone-depleting substances in order to reduce their 
abundance in the atmosphere, and thereby protect the 
Earth’s ozone layer.
Non-Annex I countries A group of developing countries 
that have signed and ratified the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. They do not have binding 
emission reduction targets.
No-tillage agriculture Farming practice characterized by 
the elimination of soil ploughing by seeding a crop directly 
under the mulch layer from the previous crop. It relies on 
permanent soil cover by organic amendments, and the 
diversification of crop species grown in sequences and/or 
association. This approach avoids emissions caused by soil 
disturbances related to ploughing, and from burning fossil 
fuels to run farm machinery for ploughing.
Pledge For the purpose of this report, pledges include 
Annex I targets and non-Annex I actions, as included in 
Appendix I and Appendix II of the Copenhagen Accord, and 
subsequently revised and updated in some instances.
Radiative forcing Change in the net, downward minus 
upward, irradiance, expressed in watts per square meter 
(W/m2), at the tropopause due to a change in an external 
driver of climate change, such as, for example, a change 
in the concentration of carbon dioxide or the output of 
the Sun.  For the purposes of this report, radiative forcing 
is further defined as the change relative to the year 1750 
and, unless otherwise noted, refers to a global and annual 
average value.
Scenario A description of how the future may unfold based 
on if-then propositions. Scenarios typically include an initial 
socio-economic situation and a description of the key driving 
forces and future changes in emissions, temperature or 
other climate change-related variables.
Strict rules Pledge cases in which the impact of land use, 
land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) credits and surplus 
emissions units are set to zero.
Top-down model A model that applies macroeconomic 
theory, econometric and optimisation techniques to 
aggregate economic variables. Using historical data on 
consumption, prices, incomes, and factor costs, top-down 
models assess final demand for goods and services, and 
supply from main sectors, such as energy, transportation, 
agriculture and industry.
Transient climate response Measure of the temperature rise 
that occurs at the time of a doubling of CO
2
 concentration in 
the atmosphere.
Transient climate response to cumulative carbon emissions 
Measure of temperature rise per unit of cumulative 
carbon emissions.
Unconditional pledges Pledges made by countries without 
conditions attached.
20th–80th percentile range Results that fall within the 
20–80 percent range of the frequency distribution of results 
in this assessment.
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Acronyms
AAU Assigned Amount Unit
ADP Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform
AR4 Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
AR5 Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
AWD Alternate Wetting and Drying
BaU Business-as-Usual
BC black carbon 
BioCCS Bio-energy combined with Carbon Capture and 
Storage 
BP British Petroleum
BRT  Bus Rapid Transit 
CCAC Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-
lived Climate Pollutants
CCS Carbon Capture and Storage 
CDIAC Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center
CDM Clean Development Mechanism 
CEM Clean Energy Ministerial
CER Certified Emission Reduction
CFC chlorofluorocarbon
CO
2
e Carbon Dioxide Equivalent
COP Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change
CP1 First Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol
CP2 Second Commitment Period of the Kyoto 
Protocol
EDGAR Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric 
Research
EIA Energy Information Administration
ERU Emission Reduction Unit
EU-ETS EU Emissions Trading System 
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEA  Global Energy Assessment 
GHG greenhouse gas
Gt gigatonne
GWP Global Warming Potential
HCFC hydrochlorofluorocarbon
HFC hydrofluorocarbon
IAM Integrated Assessment Model
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
ICI International Cooperative Initiative
IEA International Energy Agency
IMO International Maritime Organization
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
LULUCF Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry 
NAMA Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OC organic carbon 
ODS ozone depleting substances
PAM policies and measures
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
PV photovoltaic
RD&D research, development and demonstration 
REDD+  Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation 
RPS Renewable Portfolio Standards
SO
2
 sulphur dioxide
SOC soil organic carbon
TCR transient climate response
TCRE transient climate response to cumulative carbon 
emissions
UDP urea deep placement
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change
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Achim Steiner 
UN Under-Secretary-General,  
UNEP Executive Director
The latest assessment by Working Group I of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, released 
earlier this year, concluded that climate change remains 
one of the greatest challenges facing society. Warming 
of the climate system is unequivocal, human-influenced, 
and many unprecedented changes have been observed 
throughout the climate system since 1950. These changes 
threaten life on Earth as we know it. Continued emissions of 
greenhouse gases will cause further warming and changes 
in all components of the climate system. Limiting climate 
change will require substantial and sustained reductions 
of greenhouse gas emissions. But how much reduction 
is needed?
Further to the Copenhagen Accord of 2009 and the Cancún 
agreements in 2010, international efforts under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change are 
focused on keeping the average rise in global temperature 
to below 2° C, compared to pre-industrial levels. Current 
commitments and pledges by developed and developing 
nations can take the world part of the way towards achieving 
this 2° C target, but this assessment shows that the there is 
still a significant gap between political ambition and practical 
reality. In short, additional emission reductions are needed.
With this fourth assessment of the gap between ambitions 
and needs, the United Nations Environment Programme 
seeks to inform governments and the wider public on how 
far the response to climate change has progressed over the 
past year, and thus whether the world is on track to meet 
the 2° C target. In addition to reviewing national pledges 
and actions, this year’s assessment, for the first time,  also 
reviews international cooperative initiatives which, while 
potentially overlapping, serve to complement national 
pledges and actions.
From a technical standpoint, meeting the 2° C target 
remains possible: it will take a combination of full 
implementation of current national pledges and actions, a 
scaling up of the most effective international cooperative 
initiatives, and additional mitigation efforts at the country 
level. All these efforts will require strengthened policies 
aimed at curbing greenhouse gas emissions. Crucially, they 
also require the promotion of development pathways that 
can concomitantly reduce emissions.
As in the previous assessment, this year’s report provides 
updated analyses of a number of tried and tested sector-
specific policy options to achieve this goal. Specifically, 
we show that actions taken in the agricultural sector can 
lower emissions and boost the overall sustainability of 
food production. Replicating these successful policies, and 
scaling them up, would provide one option for countries 
to go beyond their current pledges and help close the 
‘emissions gap’.
The challenge we face is neither a technical nor policy 
one – it is political: the current pace of action is simply 
insufficient. The technologies to reduce emission levels to 
a level consistent with the 2° C target are available and we 
know which policies we can use to deploy them. However, 
the political will to do so remains weak. This lack of political 
will has a price: we will have to undertake steeper and 
more costly actions to potentially bridge the emissions gap 
by 2020.
This report is a call for political action. I hope that, 
by providing high quality evidence and analysis, it will 
achieve its goal of supporting international climate 
change negotiations.
Foreword
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Executive summary
The emissions gap in 2020 is the difference between 
emission levels in 2020 consistent with meeting climate 
targets, and levels expected in that year if country pledges 
and commitments are met. As it becomes less and less 
likely that the emissions gap will be closed by 2020, the 
world will have to rely on more difficult, costlier and 
riskier means after 2020 of keeping the global average 
temperature increase below 2° C. If the emissions gap is 
not closed, or significantly narrowed, by 2020, the door to 
many options limiting the temperature increase to 1.5° C at 
the end of this century will be closed.
Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (‘Climate Convention’) declares that 
its “ultimate objective” is to “[stabilize] greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system”. The parties to the Climate Convention have 
translated this objective into an important, concrete target 
for limiting the increase in global average temperature to 
2° C, compared to its pre-industrial levels. With the aim 
of meeting this target, many of the parties have made 
emission reduction pledges, while others have committed to 
reductions under the recent extension of the Kyoto Protocol.
Since 2010, the United Nations Environment Programme 
has facilitated an annual independent analysis of those 
pledges and commitments, to assess whether they are 
consistent with a least-cost approach to keep global average 
warming below 2° C 1. This report confirms and strengthens 
the conclusions of the three previous analyses that current 
pledges and commitments fall short of that goal. It further 
says that, as emissions of greenhouse gases continue to 
rise rather than decline, it becomes less and less likely that 
emissions will be low enough by 2020 to be on a least-cost 
pathway towards meeting the 2° C target2. 
As a result, after 2020, the world will have to rely on more 
difficult, costlier and riskier means of meeting the target 
– the further from the least-cost level in 2020, the higher 
these costs and the greater the risks will be. If the gap is not 
closed or significantly narrowed by 2020, the door to many 
options to limit temperature increase to 1.5° C at the end of 
this century will be closed, further increasing the need to 
rely on accelerated energy-efficiency increases and biomass 
with carbon capture and storage for reaching the target.
1. What are current global emissions?
Current global greenhouse gas emission levels are 
considerably higher than the levels in 2020 that are in 
line with meeting the 1.5° C or 2° C targets, and are still 
increasing. In 2010, in absolute levels, developing countries 
accounted for about 60 percent of global greenhouse gas 
emissions.
The most recent estimates of global greenhouse gas 
emissions are for 2010 and amount to 50.1 gigatonnes of 
carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO
2
e) per year (range: 45.6–
54.6 GtCO
2
e per year). This is already 14 percent higher than 
the median estimate of the emission level in 2020 with a 
likely chance of achieving the least cost pathway towards 
meeting the 2° C target (44 GtCO
2
e per year)3. With regards 
to emissions in 2010, the modelling groups report a median 
value of 48.8 GtCO
2
e, which is within the uncertainty range 
cited above. For consistency with emission scenarios, the 
figure of 48.8 GtCO
2
e per year is used in the calculation of 
the pledge case scenarios.
Relative contributions to global emissions from developing 
and developed countries changed little from 1990 to 1999. 
However, the balance changed significantly between 2000 
and 2010 – the developed country share decreased from 
51.8 percent to 40.9 percent, whereas developing country 
emissions increased from 48.2 percent to 59.1 percent. 
Today developing and developed countries are responsible 
for roughly equal shares of cumulative greenhouse gas 
emissions for the period 1850-2010.
____________________ 
1  For this report, a least-cost approach means that emissions are reduced by the 
cheapest means available.
2 For this report, a least-cost pathway or a least-cost emissions pathway or least-
cost emission scenarios mean the same thing – the temporal pathway of global 
emissions that meets a climate target and that also takes advantage of the lowest-
cost options available for reducing emissions.
____________________ 
3 See footnote 2.
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2.  What emission levels are anticipated     
for 2020?
Global greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 are estimated 
at 59 GtCO
2
e per year under a business-as-usual scenario. 
If implemented fully, pledges and commitments would 
reduce this by 3–7 GtCO
2
e per year. It is only possible 
to confirm that a few parties are on track to meet their 
pledges and commitments by 2020.
Global greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 are estimated at 
59 GtCO
2
e per year (range: 56–60 GtCO
2
e per year) under 
a business-as-usual scenario – that is, a scenario that only 
considers existing mitigation efforts. This is about 1 GtCO
2
e 
higher than the estimate in the 2012 emissions gap report.
There have been no significant changes in the pledges and 
commitments made by parties to the Climate Convention 
since the 2012 assessment. However, both rules of 
accounting for land-use change and forestry, and rules for 
the use of surplus allowances from the Kyoto Protocol’s first 
commitment period have been tightened.
Implementing the pledges would reduce emissions by 
3–7 GtCO
2
e, compared to business-as-usual emission levels.
A review of available evidence from 13 of the parties to the 
Climate Convention that have made pledges or commitments 
indicates that five – Australia, China, the European Union, 
India and the Russian Federation – appear to be on track to 
meet their pledges. Four parties – Canada, Japan, Mexico 
and the U.S. – may require further action and/or purchased 
offsets to meet their pledges, according to government and 
independent estimates of projected national emissions 
in 2020. A fifth party – the Republic of Korea – may also 
require further action but this could not be verified based 
on government estimates. However, new actions now 
being taken by all five of these parties many enable them 
to meet their pledges, although the impact of these actions 
have not been analyzed here. Not enough information is 
available concerning Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa. It 
is worth noting that being on track to implement pledges 
does not equate to being on track to meet the 1.5° C or 2° C 
temperature targets.
3.  What is the latest estimate of the 
emissions gap in 2020?
Even if pledges are fully implemented, the emissions gap 
in 2020 will be 8–12 GtCO
2
e per year, assuming least-cost 
emission pathways. Limited available information indicates 
that the emissions gap in 2020 to meet a 1.5° C target in 
2020 is a further 2–5 GtCO
2
e per year wider.
Least-cost emission pathways consistent with a likely 
chance of keeping global mean temperature increases below 
2° C compared to pre-industrial levels have a median level 
of 44 GtCO
2
e in 2020 (range: 38–47 GtCO
2
e)4. Assuming 
full implementation of the pledges, the emissions gap thus 
amounts to between 8–12 GtCO
2
e per year in 2020 (Table 1).
Governments have agreed to more stringent international 
accounting rules for land-use change and surplus allowances 
for the parties to the Kyoto Protocol. However, it is highly 
uncertain whether the conditions currently attached to the 
high end of country pledges will be met. Therefore, it is more 
probable than not that the gap in 2020 will be at the high 
end of the 8–12 GtCO
2
e range.
Limiting increases in global average temperature further to 
1.5° C compared to pre-industrial levels requires emissions in 
2020 to be even lower, if a least-cost path towards achieving 
this objective is followed. Based on a limited number of new 
studies, least-cost emission pathways consistent with the 
1.5° C target have emission levels in 2020 of 37–44 GtCO
2
e 
per year, declining rapidly thereafter. 
Note: 
Following the 2012 conference of the parties to the Climate Convention in Doha, a group of countries has adopted reduction commitments for the 
second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol
Source: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
____________________
4 See footnote 2.
Quantiﬁed commitments for the second 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol 
and pledges under the Cancún Agreements
Pledges formulated in terms of economy-wide emission 
reductions under the Cancún Agreements
Submitted mitigation 
actions under the
Cancún Agreements
Countries with
no pledges
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4.  What emission levels in 2025, 2030 and 
2050 are consistent with the 2° C target?
Least-cost emission pathways consistent with a likely 
chance of meeting a 2° C target have global emissions 
in 2050 that are 41 and 55 percent, respectively, below 
emission levels in 1990 and 2010.
Given the decision at the 17th Conference of the Parties to 
the Climate Convention in 2011 to complete negotiations on 
a new binding agreement by 2015 for the period after 2020, 
it has become increasingly important to estimate global 
emission levels in 2025 and thereafter that are likely to 
meet the 2° C target. In the scenarios assessed in this report, 
global emission levels in 2025 and 2030 consistent with the 
2° C target amount to approximately 40 GtCO
2
e (range: 
35–45 GtCO
2
e) and 35 GtCO
2
e (range: 32–42 GtCO
2
e), 
respectively. In these scenarios, global emissions in 2050 
amount to 22 GtCO
2
e (range: 18–25 GtCO
2
e). These levels 
are all based on the assumption that the 2020 least-cost 
level of 44 GtCO
2
e per year will be achieved.
5.  What are the implications of least-cost 
emission pathways that meet the 1.5° C 
and 2° C targets in 2020?
The longer that decisive mitigation efforts are postponed, 
the higher the dependence on negative emissions in the 
second half of the 21st century to keep the global average 
temperature increase below 2° C. The technologies required 
for achieving negative emissions may have significant 
negative environmental impacts.
Scenarios consistent with the 1.5° C and 2° C targets 
share several characteristics: higher-than-current emission 
reduction rates throughout the century; improvements 
in energy efficiency and the introduction of zero- and 
low-carbon technologies at faster rates than have been 
experienced historically over extended periods; greenhouse 
gas emissions peaking around 2020; net negative carbon 
dioxide emissions from the energy and industrial sectors 
in the second half of the century5 and an accelerated shift 
toward electrification6.
The technologies required for achieving negative emissions 
in the energy and industrial sectors have not yet been 
deployed on a large scale and their use may have significant 
impacts, notably on biodiversity and water supply. Because 
of this, some scenarios explore the emission reductions 
required to meet temperature targets without relying on 
negative emissions. These scenarios require maximum 
emissions in 2020 of 40 GtCO
2
e (range: 36–44 GtCO
2
e), as 
compared to a median of 44 GtCO
2
e for the complete set of 
least-cost scenarios.
6.  What are the implications of later action 
scenarios that still meet the 1.5° C and   
2° C targets?
Based on a much larger number of studies than in 
2012, this update concludes that so-called later-action 
scenarios have several implications compared to least-
cost scenarios, including: (i) much higher rates of global 
emission reductions in the medium term; (ii) greater lock-in 
of carbon-intensive infrastructure; (iii) greater dependence 
on certain technologies in the medium-term; (iv) greater 
costs of mitigation in the medium- and long-term, and 
greater risks of economic disruption; and (v) greater risks 
of failing to meet the 2° C target. For these reasons later-
action scenarios may not be feasible in practice and, as a 
result, temperature targets could be missed.
The estimates of the emissions gap in this and previous 
reports are based on least-cost scenarios, which characterize 
trends in global emissions up to 2100 under the assumption 
that climate targets will be met by the cheapest combination 
of policies, measures and technologies. But several new 
studies using a different type of scenario are now available 
– later-action scenarios, which assume that a least-cost 
trajectory is not followed immediately, but rather forwards 
from a specific future date. Like least-cost scenarios, later-
action scenarios chart pathways that are consistent with 
the 2° C target. Contrary to least-cost scenarios, later-action 
scenarios assume higher global emissions in the near term, 
which are compensated by deeper reductions later, typically, 
after 2020 or 2030.
For least-cost scenarios, emission reduction rates for 
2030–2050 consistent with a 2° C target are 2–4.5 percent 
per year. Historically, such reductions have been achieved in 
a small number of individual countries, but not globally. For 
later-action scenarios, the corresponding emission reduction 
rates would have to be substantially higher, for example, 
6–8.5 percent if emission reductions remain modest until 
2030. These emission reduction rates are without historic 
precedent over extended periods of time. Furthermore, 
and because of the delay between policy implementation 
and actual emission reductions, achieving such high rates 
of change would require mitigation policies to be adopted 
several years before the reductions begin.
Apart from assuming higher global emissions in the 
near term, later-action scenarios also have fewer options 
for reducing emissions when concerted action finally 
begins after 2020 or 2030. This is because of carbon lock-
in – the continued construction of high-emission fossil-fuel 
infrastructure unconstrained by climate policies. Because 
technological infrastructure can have life-times of up to 
several decades, later-action scenarios effectively lock-in in 
these high-emission alternatives for a long period of time.
By definition, later-action scenarios are more expensive 
than least-cost scenarios. The actual cost penalty of later 
action depends on the future availability of technologies 
when comprehensive mitigation actions finally begin, as 
well as on the magnitude of emission reductions up to 
that point. Finally, although later-action scenarios might 
reach the same temperature targets as their least-cost 
counterparts, later-action scenarios pose greater risks of 
climate impacts for four reasons. First, delaying action allows 
more greenhouse gases to build-up in the atmosphere in the 
near term, thereby increasing the risk that later emission 
reductions will be unable to compensate for this build up. 
Second, the risk of overshooting climate targets for both 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and global 
temperature increase is higher with later-action scenarios. 
____________________
5 For most scenarios.
6 Net negative carbon dioxide emissions from the energy and industrial sectors 
refers to the potential to actively remove more carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere than is emitted within a given period of time. Negative emissions can 
be achieved through, among other means, bioenergy in combination with carbon 
capture and storage.
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Median estimate of level 
consistent with 2° C: 
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Shaded area shows likely range (≥66%) 
to limit global temperature increase 
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Third, the near-term rate of temperature increase is higher, 
which implies greater near-term climate impacts. Lastly, 
when action is delayed, options to achieve stringent levels of 
climate protection are increasingly lost.
7.  Can the gap be bridged by 2020?
The technical potential for reducing emissions to levels in 
2020 is still estimated at about 17 ± 3 GtCO
2
e. This is enough 
to close the gap between business-as-usual emission 
levels and levels that meet the 2° C target, but time is 
running out.
Sector-level studies of emission reductions reveal that, 
at marginal costs below US $50–100 per tonne of carbon 
dioxide equivalent, emissions in 2020 could be reduced 
by 17 ± 3 GtCO
2
e, compared to business-as-usual levels in 
that same year. While this potential would, in principle, be 
enough to reach the least-cost target of 44 GtCO
2
e in 2020, 
there is little time left. 
There are many opportunities to narrow the emissions 
gap in 2020 as noted in following paragraphs, ranging from 
applying more stringent accounting practices for emission 
reduction pledges, to increasing the scope of pledges. To 
bridge the emissions gap by 2020, all options should be 
brought into play.
8.  What are the options to bridge the 
emissions gap?
The application of strict accounting rules for national 
mitigation action could narrow the gap by 1–2 GtCO
2
e. In 
addition, moving from unconditional to conditional pledges 
could narrow the gap by 2–3 GtCO
2
e, and increasing the 
scope of current pledges could further narrow the gap by 
1.8 GtCO
2
e. These three steps can bring us halfway to 
bridging the gap. The remaining gap can be bridged 
through further national and international action, including 
international cooperative initiatives. Much of this action 
will help fulfil national interests outside of climate policy.
Minimizing the use of lenient land-use credits and of 
surplus emission reductions, and avoiding double counting 
of offsets could narrow the gap by about 1–2 GtCO
2
e. 
Implementing the more ambitious conditional pledges 
(rather than the unconditional pledges) could narrow the 
gap by 2–3 GtCO
2
e. A range of actions aimed at increasing 
the scope of current pledges could narrow the gap by an 
additional 1.8 GtCO
2
e. (These include covering all emissions 
in national pledges, having all countries pledge emission 
reductions, and reducing emissions from international 
transport). Adding together the more stringent accounting 
practices, the more ambitious pledges, and the increased 
scope of current pledges, reduces the gap around 6 GtCO
2
e 
or by about a half.
The remaining gap can be bridged through further national 
and international action, including international cooperative 
initiatives (see next point). Also important is the fact that 
many actions to reduce emissions can help meet other 
national and local development objectives such as reducing 
air pollution or traffic congestion, or saving household 
energy costs.
9.  How can international cooperative 
initiatives contribute to narrowing         
the gap?
There is an increasing number of international cooperative 
initiatives, through which groups of countries and/or other 
entities cooperate to promote technologies and policies 
that have climate benefits, even though climate change 
mitigation may not be the primary goal of the initiative. 
These efforts have the potential to help bridge the gap by 
several GtCO
2
e in 2020.
International cooperative initiatives take the form of either 
global dialogues (to exchange information and understand 
national priorities), formal multi-lateral processes 
(addressing issues that are relevant to the reduction of 
GHG emissions), or implementation initiatives (often 
structured around technical dialogue fora or sector-specific 
implementation projects). Some make a direct contribution 
to climate change mitigation, by effectively helping countries 
reduce emissions, while others contribute to this goal 
indirectly, for example through consensus building efforts or 
the sharing of good practices among members.
The most important areas for international cooperative 
initiatives appear to be:
-	 Energy efficiency (up to 2 GtCO
2
e by 2020): covered by 
a substantial number of initiatives.
-	 Fossil fuel subsidy reform (0.4–2 GtCO
2
e by 2020): the 
number of initiatives and clear commitments in this 
area is limited.
-	 Methane and other short-lived climate pollutants 
(0.6–1.1 GtCO
2
e by 2020); this area is covered by one 
overarching and several specific initiatives. (Reductions 
here may occur as a side effect of other climate 
mitigation.)
-	 Renewable energy (1–3 GtCO
2
e by 2020): several 
initiatives have been started in this area.
Based on limited evidence, the following provisions 
could arguably enhance the effectiveness of  International 
Cooperative Initiatives: (i) a clearly defined vision and 
mandate with clearly articulated goals; (ii) the right mix of 
participants appropriate for that mandate, going beyond 
traditional climate negotiators; (iii) stronger participation 
from developing country actors; (iv) sufficient funding and 
an institutional structure that supports implementation and 
follow-up, but maintains flexibility; and (v) and incentives for 
participants.
10.  How can national agricultural policies 
promote development while substantially 
reducing emissions?
Agriculture now contributes about 11 percent to global 
greenhouse gas emissions. The estimated emission 
reduction potential for the sector ranges from 1.1 GtCO
2
e 
to 4.3 GtCO
2
e in 2020. Emission reductions achieved by 
these initiatives may partly overlap with national pledges, 
but in some cases may also be additional to these.
Not many countries have specified action in the 
agriculture sector as part of implementing their pledges. Yet, 
estimates of emission reduction potentials for the sector 
are high, ranging from 1.1 GtCO
2
e to 4.3 GtCO
2
e – a wide 
range, reflecting uncertainties in the estimate. In this year’s 
update we describe policies that have proved to be effective 
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Table 1 Emissions reductions with respect to business-as-usual and emissions gap in 2020, by pledge case
Case Pledge type Rule type Median emission levels       
and range (GtCO
2
e per year)
Reductions with respect to 
business-as-usual in 2020 
(GtCO
2
e per year)
Emissions gap in 2020      
(GtCO
2
e per year)
Case 1 Unconditional Lenient 56 (54–56) 3  12
Case 2 Unconditional Strict 55 (53–55) 4  11
Case 3 Conditional Lenient 54 (52–54) 5  10
Case 4 Conditional Strict 52 (50–52) 7  8
Note: In this report, an unconditional pledge is one made without conditions attached. A conditional pledge might depend on the ability of a 
national legislature to enact necessary laws, or may depend on action from other countries, or on the provision of finance or technical support. 
Strict rules means that allowances from land use, land-use change and forestry accounting and surplus emission credits will not be counted as 
part of a country’s meeting their emissions reduction pledges. Under lenient rules, these elements can be counted.
in reducing emissions and increasing carbon uptake in the 
agricultural sector.
In addition to contributing to climate change mitigation, 
these measures enhance the sector’s environmental 
sustainability and, depending on the measure and situation, 
may provide other benefits such as higher yields, lower 
fertilizer costs or extra profits from wood supply. Three 
examples are:
-	 Usage of no-tillage practices: no-tillage refers to the 
elimination of ploughing by direct seeding under the 
mulch layer of the previous season’s crop. This reduces 
greenhouse gas emissions from soil disturbance and 
from fossil-fuel use of farm machinery.
-	 Improved nutrient and water management in rice 
production: this includes innovative cropping practices 
such as alternate wetting and drying and urea deep 
placement that reduce methane and nitrous oxide 
emissions.
-	 Agroforestry: this consists of different management 
practices that all deliberately include woody perennials 
on farms and the landscape, and which increase 
the uptake and storage of carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere in biomass and soils.
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Introduction
Chapter 1
In December of 2009, 114 parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (the ‘Climate 
Convention’) agreed to the Copenhagen Accord1. Among the 
important provisions of the accord was the call to parties to 
submit voluntary emission reduction pledges for the year 
2020. To date, 42 developed countries have responded 
to this call and submitted economy-wide greenhouse gas 
emission reduction pledges, 16 developing countries have 
submitted multi-sector expected emission reductions, and 
in addition 39 other developing countries have submitted 
pledges related to sectoral goals2. Another important 
provision was the setting of a target to keep the increase 
in global average temperature below 2°C relative to pre-
industrial levels. In the wake of these two provisions, some 
very critical questions arose: 
-	 Are the pledges for 2020 enough to keep the world on 
track to meet the 2° C target? 
-	 Will there be a gap between where we need to be in 
2020 versus where we expect to be?
UNEP, together with the scientific community, took on 
these questions in a report published just ahead of the 
Climate Convention meeting in Cancún in late 2010 (UNEP, 
2010). This “emissions gap” report synthesized the latest 
scientific knowledge about the possible gap between the 
global emissions levels in 2020 consistent with the 2° C 
target versus the expected levels if countries fulfil their 
emission reduction pledges. Many parties to the Climate 
Convention found this analysis useful as a reference point 
for establishing the level of ambition that countries needed 
to pursue in controlling their greenhouse gas emissions. As 
a result they asked UNEP to produce annual follow-ups, with 
updates of the gap and advice on how to close it.
Besides updating the estimates of the emissions gap, the 
2011 report also looked at feasible ways of bridging the gap 
from two perspectives (UNEP, 2011). The first was from the 
top-down viewpoint of integrated models, which showed 
that feasible transformations in the energy system and other 
sectors would lower global emissions enough to meet the 
2° C target. The second was a bottom-up perspective, which 
examined the emissions reduction potential in each of the 
main emissions-producing sectors of the economy. These 
bottom-up estimates showed that enough total potential 
exists to bridge the emissions gap in 2020. 
The 2012 report presented an update of the gap but 
also good examples of best-practice policy instruments 
for reducing emissions. Among these were actions such 
as implementing appliance standards and vehicle fuel-
efficiency guidelines, which are working successfully in many 
parts of the world and are ready for application elsewhere to 
help reduce emissions.
The current report reviews the latest estimates of the 
emissions gap in 2020 and provides plentiful additional 
information relevant to the climate negotiations. Included 
are the latest estimates of:
-	 the current level of global greenhouse gas emissions 
based on authoritative sources;
-	 national emission levels, both current (2010) and 
projected (2020), consistent with current pledges and 
other commitments;
-	 global emission levels consistent with the 2° C target in 
2020, 2030 and 2050;
-	 progress being made in different parts of the world to 
achieve substantial emission reductions.
New to this fourth report is an assessment of the extent to 
which countries are on track to meet their national pledges. 
Also new is a description of the many cooperative climate 
initiatives being undertaken internationally among many 
different actors – public, private, and from civil society.
Special attention is given to analysing new scenarios 
that assume later action for mitigation, compared to those 
used earlier to compute the emissions gap. The report also 
describes new findings from scientific literature about the 
impacts of later action to reduce global emissions.
This year the report reviews best practices in reducing 
emissions in an often-overlooked emissions-producing 
sector – agriculture. Innovative ideas are described for 
transforming agriculture into a more sustainable, low-
emissions form.
As in previous years, this report has been prepared by a 
wide range of scientists from around the world. This year 
____________________ 
1  Since then, the number of parties agreeing to the Accord has risen to 141 (see 
https://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/items/5262.php).
2 With the 28 member states of the European Union counted as one party.
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70 scientists from 44 scientific groups in 17 countries have 
contributed to the assessment.
The information contained in the report provides 
invaluable inputs to the current debate on global climate 
policy and the actions needed to meet international climate 
targets. Meeting these targets is instrumental for limiting 
the adverse impacts of climate change and associated 
‘adaptation gaps’ as illustrated in Box 1.1. UNEP hopes that 
this fourth update will help catalyse action in the forthcoming 
climate negotiations.
Box 1.1 From emissions gap to adaptation gap
This report’s definition of the emissions gap is based on the internationally agreed limit to the increase in global 
average temperature of 2° C (or possibly 1.5°C). Chapter 3 summarizes the latest scientific findings regarding 
both least-cost and later-action scenarios for meeting that 1.5 or 2° C target. The chapter concludes that, 
with later-action scenarios, the cost and risk of not meeting the target increases significantly, compared to 
least-cost scenarios.
The 2° C target has become associated with what the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) termed 
“dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”, even though the IPCC has thus far never 
attached a specific temperature threshold to the concept. Nevertheless, the IPCC has characterised “dangerous 
anthropogenic interference” through five “reasons for concern”, namely risk to unique and threatened systems, 
risk of extreme weather events, disparities of impacts and vulnerabilities, aggregate damage and risks of large-
scale discontinuities.
These reasons for concern would thus gain particular relevance in the event that the world followed a later-action 
scenario emissions trajectory that in the end failed to meet the 1.5 or 2° C target. Today, when the choice between 
least-cost and later-action scenarios is still available to us, later-action scenarios highlight a growing adaptation 
problem which, by analogy with the emissions gap, could be termed an adaptation gap.
The adaptation gap is more of a challenge to assess than the emissions gap. Whereas carbon dioxide and its 
equivalents provide a common metric for quantifying the emissions gap, we lack a comparable metric for 
quantifying the adaptation gap and assessing the impacts of efforts to close it. While the emissions gap indicates 
the quantity of greenhouse gas emissions that need to be abated, the adaptation gap could measure vulnerabilities 
which need to be reduced but are not accounted for in any funded programme for reducing adaptation risks. 
Alternatively, it could estimate the gap between the level of funding needed for adaptation and the level of funding 
actually committed to the task. Developing countries needs for adaptation are believed to cost in the range of 
US $100 billion per year (UNFCCC, 2007; World Bank, 2010). By comparison the funds made available by the major 
multilateral funding mechanisms that generate and disperse adaptation finance add up to a total of around US 
$3.9 billion to date. From a funding perspective therefore, the adaptation gap is significant3.
The concept of the adaptation gap is in line with the IPCC’s Working Group II’s use of the term adaptation deficit, 
which is used to describe the deficit between the current state of a country or management system and a state 
that would minimize the adverse impacts of current climate conditions.
Framing the adaptation gap in a way useful for policy making also requires a better understanding of how the 
costs of adaptation vary with different temperature projections. Data on the costs of adaptation under business-
as-usual, and best- and worst-case emission scenarios could help policy makers better understand the relationship 
between adaptation to, and mitigation of climate change. Adaptation cost estimates also put the true costs of 
climate change, as opposed to only looking at the costs of mitigating it, into a broader and clearer perspective.
There is also a knowledge gap between what we know and what we need to know to successfully adapt to climate 
change. It is true that we already have enough knowledge to act on adaptation, but not enough to act well. For 
example, we lack information about how much existing and planned policies can reduce people’s vulnerability. 
Evaluating the effectiveness of various interventions would arguably be a very effective way of measuring progress 
towards adaptation.
____________________ 
3 The US $3.9 billion figure is a rough estimate based on information from the 
following major multilateral funding mechanisms for adaptation: an equivalent of 
US $399 million has been committed by the EU’s Global Climate Change Alliance 
from 2008 to 2013 (GCCA, 2013). (It should be noted that part of these funds 
have supported clean energy, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD) and Disaster Risk Reduction programme); cumulative pledges 
to the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund 
amounted to a total of US $863 million from their inception to May 2013, (GEF, 
2013); US $2.3 billion has been pledged to the Strategic Climate Fund Trust fund as 
of December 31, 2012 (World Bank, 2013); and the Adaptation Fund had received 
resources amounting to US $324 billion as of 30 November, 2012 (Adaptation 
Fund, 2012).
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Emission trends, pledges and their 
implementation
Chapter 2
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an update, based on the scientific 
literature, of the following critical topics:
-	 current (2010 global) emissions of greenhouse gases;
-	 projected emissions (to 2020) of greenhouse gases 
under a business-as-usual (BaU) scenario;
-	 projections (to 2020) of greenhouse gas emissions 
under four different sets of assumptions regarding 
implementation of national pledges to reduce 
emissions;
-	 the extent to which parties are positioned to implement 
their pledges, in light of their current policy portfolios 
and plausible assumptions regarding macroeconomic 
trends and offsets.
The estimated emission level in 2020 under a business-as-
usual scenario is 1 gigatonne of carbon dioxide equivalent 
(GtCO
2
e) higher compared to last year’s emissions gap 
report1. While the emission levels in 2020 for the strict-rules 
cases are higher by roughly 1 GtCO
2
e (unconditional) and 
are comparable to last year’s emission level (conditional), 
the emission levels associated with the two lenient-rules 
cases are lower by roughly 1 GtCO
2
e, as compared to last 
year’s estimates. These changes are mainly due to decisions 
on surpluses made by countries during the Doha climate 
negotiations and downward revisions to the assumptions 
on double counting of offsets. They illustrate that increasing 
stringency through the climate negotiations can help 
reduce emission levels in 2020 under lenient-rules cases. 
However, they do not reflect an increase in ambition or 
action, but represent a move towards stricter accounting 
rules. To illustrate, in last year’s emissions gap report, 
emission levels associated with the strict-rules cases were
3 GtCO
2
e lower than those of the lenient-rules cases, whereas 
this year they are lower by around 1 GtCO
2
e (unconditional) 
and 2 GtCO
2
e (conditional).
While previous reports assumed full pledge 
implementation, this year we also explore the extent 
to which 13 parties, accounting for 72 percent of global 
greenhouse gas emissions, are already on track to implement 
their pledges, and where further policy implementation or 
offsets are likely to be required.
2.2 Current global emissions
Last year’s report estimated total global greenhouse 
gas emissions in 2010 at 50.1 GtCO
2
e, with a 95 percent 
uncertainty range of 45.6–54.6 GtCO
2
e2. This bottom-up 
estimate from the EDGAR database (JRC/PBL, 2012) has 
not been updated since and is considered a comprehensive 
assessment of global greenhouse gas emissions in 20103. 
Figure 2.1 shows emission levels by major economic grouping 
for the period 1970–2010, using this database4. These 
may differ from data derived from the National Inventory 
Reports, which are the latest estimate of emissions for most 
developed countries. The latest global estimates of energy-
related carbon dioxide emissions show a continued increase 
for the years 2011 and 2012, although at a lower pace than 
the average since the beginning of the 21st century (Olivier 
et al., 2013)5.
Lead authors: Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Netherlands), Taryn Fransen (World Resources 
Institute, USA), Hans-Holger Rogner (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria)
Contributing authors: Johannes Gütschow (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Germany), Giacomo Grassi (European 
Commission’s Joint Research Centre, Italy), Niklas Höhne (Ecofys, Germany), Kelly Levin (World Resources Institute, USA), Elizabeth 
Sawin (Climate Interactive, USA), Mark Roelfsema (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Netherlands), Christopher Taylor 
(Department of Energy and Climate Change, United Kingdom), Zhao Xiusheng (Tshingua University, China)
____________________
1 Unless otherwise stated, all emissions in this report are expressed in GtCO
2
e. 
This is the sum of six of the greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol (that 
is CO
2
, CH
4
, N
2
O, HFCs, PFCs and SF
6
), weighted by their global warming potential 
(GWP) (UNFCCC, 2002). Not included are ozone depleting substances (ODS), black 
carbon (BC), and organic carbon (OC). While nitrogen trifluoride (NF
3
) has recently 
been added to the Kyoto Protocol, it has not been included in this analysis. Unless 
otherwise stated, data include emissions from land use, land-use change and 
forestry (LULUCF).
____________________
2 This estimate included all six Kyoto gases and also takes into account emissions 
from land use, land-use change and forestry.
3  Another comprehensive assessment of global GHG emissions is WRI’s CAIT 
database that estimated total global GHG emissions in 2010 at 47.2 GtCO
2
e.
4 The reader is referred to last year’s report (UNEP 2012a) for a breakdown 
by gas.
5 The reader is referred to Appendix 2A for further details.
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Figure 2.1 Trend in global greenhouse gas emissions 1970–2010 by major economic grouping.
Note: The data plotted has been calculated using global warming potential values as used for UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol reporting. 
The graph shows emissions of 50.1 GtCO
2
e in 2010, as derived from bottom-up emission inventories.
Source: EDGAR 4.2 FT2010 (JRC/PBL, 2012. Percentages refer to shares in global emissions in 2010.
While the last decade of the 20th century saw little 
change in the relative regional contributions to annual 
global greenhouse gas emissions, this changed drastically 
during the first decade of the 21st century. Between 2000 
and 2010, the developed country share decreased from 
51.8 percent to 40.9 percent, whereas developing country 
emissions increased from 48.2 percent to 59.1 percent (JRC/
PBL, 2012). Referring to Figure 2.1, between 2000 and 2010 
the share of global emissions of the non-OECD G20 countries 
(i.e. Argentina, China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, the Russian 
Federation, Saudi Arabia and South Africa) increased by 
8.7 percent, while the share of all OECD countries and other 
industrialized countries declined by 9.0 percent, and the 
share of the remaining developing countries changed little. 
Today developing and developed countries are responsible 
for roughly equal shares of cumulative greenhouse gas 
emissions for the period 1850-2010 (den Elzen et al., 2013b).
Greenhouse gas emission estimates are uncertain due to 
differences in definitions and in the accounting of national 
emissions. To produce a statistically significant assessment 
of the uncertainty associated with those emission estimates, 
a large number of independent but consistent datasets is 
required, which at present is not the case (Appendix 2.A). 
It is nonetheless clear that energy-related carbon dioxide 
emissions have the lowest uncertainty (UNEP, 2012a), 
while land use and land-use change emissions of different 
greenhouse gases have the highest.
2.3  Projected global emissions under 
business-as-usual scenarios
Business-as-usual scenarios of future developments are 
generally based on an extrapolation of current economic, 
social and technological trends. They usually reflect policies 
that have taken effect as of a recent cut-off date, for example, 
20108. However, in some cases they may include policies 
that, while approved, will only enter into force at a future 
date (DEA/OECD/URC, 2013).
Business-as-usual scenarios of greenhouse gases are 
benchmarks against which the effectiveness of mitigation 
policies and measures can be tested. They are also used in 
this report to assess the extent to which parties’ pledges can 
meet the 2o C or 1.5o C targets.
Business-as-usual emissions for 2020 were derived 
from estimates by 12 modelling groups that analyzed the 
reduction proposals of parties, as described in Section 2.4 9. 
Most of the modelling groups followed the same approach 
with regards to the types of policies included in the BaU 
scenario – they did not include new policies with a potential 
effect on greenhouse gas emissions beyond those in effect 
at the cut-off date10. Some of the modelling groups used the 
BaU scenarios that the parties provided.
Based on the analysis by these 12 modelling groups, 
global greenhouse gas emissions for 2020 are estimated 
at 59 GtCO
2
e (range 56–60 GtCO
2
e) in 2020 under BaU 
assumptions, which is about 1 GtCO
2
e higher than the figure 
in the 2012 emissions gap report11. Two key factors explain 
____________________
8 BaU scenarios typically vary with regard to which policies they take into account 
for a variety of reasons, including: the cut-off year for their inclusion; whether 
policies have to be planned, adopted, and/or implemented if they are to be 
included; methodologies for quantifying the effect of included policies; and the 
determination of whether a policy will have a significant effect that warrants 
inclusion. 
9 See Table B.1 in Appendix 2.B for a listing of the modelling groups.
10 The cut-off date for exclusion of policies varies among the modelling groups.
11 Unless stated otherwise, all ranges in the report are expressed as 20th–80th 
percentiles. 
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this increase: using the BaU numbers from China’s second 
national communication to UNFCCC (Government of China, 
2012), and moving the base year from 2005 to 2010 in more 
model studies12.
To test the robustness of the 59 GtCO
2
e BaU estimate, we 
compare our estimates with those of several international 
modelling groups, including six that are participating in the 
studies discussed in Section 2.4 (Kriegler et al., 2013)13. 
The BaU scenarios with which we compared our estimates
(24 scenarios, developed by 12 different models) give 
a median of 58 GtCO
2
e, with a range of 55–60 GtCO
2
e. In 
spite of the different lower bound, this median, 58 GtCO
2
e, 
is consistent with that obtained by the modelling groups 
contributing to this report.
2.4 Projected global emissions under pledge 
assumptions
Under the 2010 Cancún Agreements of the Climate 
Convention, 42 developed-country parties have submitted 
quantified economy-wide emission reduction proposals for 
2020. Since November 2012, when the last emissions gap 
report was released, only New Zealand has significantly 
changed its pledge14. Some countries, notably Mexico, have 
changed underlying assumptions that effectively change 
their pledge15.
At the latest Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Climate 
Convention, held in in Doha in late 2012, parties agreed on 
a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. This 
period will run from 2013 to 2020 and provides for quantified 
emission reduction targets for the following Annex I parties: 
Australia, Belarus, the European Union and its member 
states, Kazakhstan, Monaco, Norway, Switzerland and 
Ukraine. No binding emission reduction targets were set for 
any other Climate Convention parties, neither Annex-I nor 
non-Annex I.
To date 55 developing country parties and the African 
group have submitted nationally appropriate mitigation 
actions (NAMAs) to Climate Convention (UNFCCC, 2013). Of 
these, 16 have been framed in terms of multi-sector expected 
greenhouse gas emission reductions16. The remaining 39 are 
expressed as sectoral goals or, in fewer instances, specific 
mitigation projects. In this assessment only the former 16 
are considered17. Together, the 42 developed country parties 
with reduction targets and the 16 developing country parties 
accounted for about 75 percent of global emissions in 2010.
____________________
12 This resulted in higher emission levels, as economic activity – and thus emission 
levels – was higher in the period 2005–2010, compared to the previous base year.
 13 The estimates in this report do not include new policies affecting greenhouse 
gas emissions after the cut-off year. 
14  In August 2013, New Zealand announced a single 5 percent reduction target 
with respect to its 1990 emission levels, replacing its initial 10–20 percent target.
15 The Mexican government recently updated the country’s BaU scenario for 2020. 
This updated scenario leads to 960 MtCO
2
e emissions, which is above the previous 
BaU estimate, and also affects the 2020 emissions resulting from the pledge 
(see Box 2.1).
____________________ 
16 China and India have expressed their mitigation goals in terms of emission 
reductions per unit of GDP; Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and the 
Republic of Korea, in terms of deviations below their respective BaU emission 
scenarios; Antigua and Barbuda, Marshall Islands and Republic of Moldova, in 
terms of absolute greenhouse gas emission reductions; and Costa Rica and the 
Maldives, in terms of a carbon neutrality goal. The reader is referred to Appendix 
2.C for additional details on these goals.
17 Quantifying the emission reductions resulting from these 39 actions is difficult. 
For this reason, this assessment assumes no reductions below BaU emission 
scenarios for these countries. This might be a conservative assumption.
18 For example, in November 2012, as a part of the country’s second national 
communication to the Climate Convention, the Chinese government released 
national BaU and mitigation scenarios for the first time (Government of China, 
2012). The BaU scenario excludes all climate-related policies implemented 
since 2005, which leads to energy-related carbon dioxide emissions of 
14.4 GtCO
2
 in 2020. The mitigation scenario reflects both domestic policies and the 
country’s international emission-intensity target and results in emissions levels of 
4.5 GtCO
2
 below BaU levels. Similarly, the Mexican government recently updated 
the country’s BaU scenario for 2020.
Box 2.1 Current and projected emission levels for 13 UNFCCC parties with a pledge
Figure 2.2 shows past (1990, 2005 and 2010) as expected and future (2020) emission levels for 13 Climate 
Convention parties that have submitted quantitative emission reduction pledges. Four different projections 
to 2020 are presented: the national BaU scenario, the median BaU value from several international modelling 
studies, and the emission levels resulting from implementation of two emission reduction pledge cases (see the 
next section for a description of the different pledge cases).
Annex I parties have defined their commitments in terms of emission reductions in 2020 relative to historical 
emission levels, typically emission levels in 1990. Conversely, non-Annex I parties have defined them in terms of 
emission reductions in 2020 relative to hypothetical future emission levels, typically against BaU levels in 2020, or 
in terms of greenhouse gas emission intensity. In this second case, the uncertainty about actual emission levels in 
2020 is carried over into the estimate of the emission reductions commitment.
Most national BaU scenarios from non-Annex I parties are relatively high compared to the range in the corresponding 
scenario by 12 modelling studies. The reasons for this are numerous, including differences in definitions, notably 
as to which policies are considered in the baseline, as well in the nature of the assumptions made (DEA/OECD/
URC, 2013). Crucially, some developing countries are increasingly clarifying those assumptions and the methods 
used to calculate the baseline18.
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Box 2.1 Current and projected emission levels for 13 UNFCCC parties with a pledge (continued)
Figure 2.2 Greenhouse gas emissions, including land-use change, for 1990, 2005, 2010 and for 2020 under a national BaU 
(if available), median of the BaU assumed by modelling groups, unconditional pledge and conditional pledge for UNFCCC parties 
included in the G20 with a pledge, taking the European Union as a group.
Note: For developed countries, emissions exclude emissions from land-use change.
Note: European Union data include all current European Union member countries except Croatia, which joined the European 
Union on 1 July, 2013.
Source: EDGAR (JRC/PBL, 2012)19.
____________________ 
19  National BaUs were obtained from the following sources. For developed 
countries, we use the best representation of a with-policies BaU scenario, i.e.: 
Australia (Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 2012); Canada 
(Environment Canada, 2012); European Union (European Environment Agency, 
2012); Japan: not available; Russia (Government of the Russian Federation, 2010); 
USA (EIA, 2012; Bianco et al., 2013). For developing countries without-policies BaU 
scenarios (den Elzen et al., 2013a), i.e.: Brazil (Brazilian Government, 2010); China 
(Government of China, 2012), supplemented with the average estimate non-
energy CO
2
 emission projection from den Elzen et al., 2013a and estimates from 
Climate Action Tracker; India (Planning Commission, 2011); Indonesia (Ministry of 
Environment, 2010), Mexico (NCCS, 2013); South Africa (South Africa. Department 
of Environmental Affairs, 2011); Korea, Republic of (Republic of Korea, 2011). Note 
that the national BaUs for South Africa and India were reported as a range. For the 
figures, the mid-point has been used.
Some pledges are unconditional, whereas others have 
been made conditional on the ability of a national legislature 
to enact necessary laws, the action of other countries, or the 
provision of financial or technical support. We refer to these 
pledges as, respectively, unconditional and conditional. 
Some countries have submitted one of each type, whereas 
others have submitted only a conditional or only an 
unconditional pledge. This creates a range of possible 
collective impacts from the pledges, bounded on the low 
end if only unconditional pledges are implemented, and 
on the high end if all conditional pledges are implemented. 
Emission levels in 2020 resulting from implementation of 
the pledges also depend on the rules used to account for 
both land use and land-use change credits and debits, and 
surplus emission units. These concepts are introduced in 
the following sections, followed by a quantification of the 
emission reductions resulting from different combinations of 
pledge cases.
2.4.1 Use of land use, land-use change and 
forestry credits and debits
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I parties may receive 
credits or debits from land use, land-use change and forestry 
(LULUCF) activities dependent on a set of complex accounting 
rules that contribute to the achievement of their individual 
emission reduction targets. During the seventeenth 
Conference of the Parties to the Climate Convention, held 
in Durban in late 2011, new LULUCF accounting rules for 
countries participating in the second commitment period 
(CP2) of the Kyoto Protocol were agreed (UNFCCC, 2012a). 
The potential contribution of LULUCF accounting under 
these new rules appears to be relatively modest for Annex 
I parties that joined the first commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol (Grassi et al., 2012): a difference of up to 
about 2 percent of 1990 emissions between strict and 
lenient accounting, equal to about 0.3 GtCO
2
e per year. If 
the USA, which did not join the first commitment period of 
the Kyoto Protocol, followed these rules, the number would 
increase to 0.45 GtCO
2
e per year20. While these estimates 
____________________ 
20  For the USA, the estimated potential contribution from LULUCF credits is 
about 0.15 GtCO
2
e per year. This is calculated as follows: for forest management, 
assuming 2005 as reference year and given the available projections for 2020 
(United States Department of State, 2010), the credit is estimated at about 
0.07 GtCO
2
e per year; an additional credit of about 0.08 GtCO
2
e per year is 
estimated from afforestation/reforestation and deforestation (EPA, 2005).
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____________________ 
21 For example, in the case of Russia, if the “appropriate accounting of the potential 
of the forestry sector” (UNFCCC, 2012c) is interpreted as not applying the cap on 
forest management credits agreed in Durban, LULUCF credits in Russia alone may 
reach 0.3 GtCO
2
e per year, instead of the 0.1 GtCO
2
e per year assumed in this 
assessment.
22 This would apply if all surplus credits were purchased by parties with pledges 
that do require emission reductions, displacing mitigation action in buying parties.
23 The European Union stated in Doha that their legislation does not allow the 
use of carried over surplus units (UNFCCC, 2012b). However, it is unclear if this 
statement is fully binding. Purchase of units was not excluded by the European 
Union, but is highly unlikely to happen, as the European Union holds the largest 
share of surplus units.
24  In their respective pledges, the governments of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus 
proposed target emission levels above that 2008-2010 emissions average. Further 
details are available in Chen et al. (2013) and Kollmuss (2013).
____________________ 
25 Calculations assume as a starting point the initial assigned amounts of the first 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The uncertainty ranges come from the 
future decisions of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. If these countries stay in the 
second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and lower their commitments to 
their 2008-2010 emission levels, they can make use of surplus emissions.
26 At least in theory, emission reductions could also be shared, with a certain 
percentage attributed to the buyer and the seller retaining the remainder.
are generally consistent with the information contained in 
UNFCCC (2012c), they may underestimate emissions from 
those countries that may adopt different accounting rules 
from those of the Kyoto Protocol, for example, Canada, 
Japan, New Zealand and Russia21.
2.4.2 Surplus emissions units
Estimates of emission levels in 2020 can also be influenced 
by the potential use of surplus emission units. These surplus 
units could arise either when parties’ actual emissions are 
below their emission targets for the first commitment period 
of the Kyoto Protocol, or when their emissions in 2020 are 
below their target for that year, when this does not require 
significant emission reductions. Note that surplus emission 
units refers to surpluses arising from different types of 
allowances  – assigned amount units, emission reduction 
units and certified emission reductions – all introduced in 
the next paragraphs.
The 2012 emissions gap report estimated the maximum 
emission reduction in 2020 due to surplus credits at 
1.8 GtCO
2
e22. However, as a result of the rules for using 
such surplus allowances agreed to in Doha, these estimates 
need to be revised (UNFCCC, 2012b; Kollmuss, 2013). The 
parties agreed that allowances, referred to as ‘assigned 
amount units’ (AAUs), not used in the first commitment 
period can be carried over to the next period. However, 
recent decisions on surplus emission units significantly 
limit the use of such surplus allowances and prevent the 
build-up of new ones. Only parties participating in the 
second commitment period can sell their surplus assigned 
amount units. This will exclude Russia, which is the largest 
holder of surplus assigned amount units, but which will 
not participate in the second commitment period. Buyer 
countries can only purchase surplus assigned amount units 
up to a quantity of 2 percent of their own initial assigned 
amount for the first commitment period. In addition, 
Australia, Japan, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway and 
Switzerland have said that they will not purchase units from 
others, while the European Union has declared that they 
will not use any surplus emissions units (UNFCCC, 2012b)23. 
Finally, new surplus allowances are prevented by the fact 
that allowances that exceed the parties’ average emission 
levels in the period 2008–2010 will be cancelled. This rule 
affects Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine24.
These decisions reduce the impact of surplus emissions 
in 2020. Based on Chen et al. (2013) and Gütschow (2013), 
the impact of Kyoto surpluses on 2020 pledges is estimated 
to be about 0.05 GtCO
2
e (range 0.05–0.15 GtCO
2
e) for the 
unconditional pledge scenario and 0.55 GtCO
2
e (range 0.5–
0.6 GtCO
2
e) for the conditional pledge scenario, down from 
1.8 GtCO
2
e as previously estimated25.
The difference between scenarios stems from the 
European Union’s declaration in Doha that its internal 
legislation will not allow the use of surplus assigned amount 
units carried over from the first commitment period, for 
complying with its 20 percent unconditional pledge. For its 
30 percent conditional pledge, the European Union has more 
than enough Kyoto surplus emissions to realize the required 
emission reductions. The impact of surplus emissions could 
also be zero if the European Union decides not to use any of 
its Kyoto surplus emissions for complying with its 30 percent 
conditional target.
In addition to the assigned amount units, two of the Kyoto 
Protocol’s flexible mechanisms, the Joint Implementation 
and the Clean Development Mechanism, provide credits 
that parties can use in the form of emission reduction 
units (ERUs) in the case of Joint Implementation, and 
certified emission reductions (CERs) in the case of the Clean 
Development Mechanism. These credits can be carried over 
to the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The 
2012 Conference of the Parties to the Climate Convention 
did not change the rules for these credits: certified emission 
reductions and emission reduction units can each be carried 
over up to 2.5 percent of the initial assigned amount of the 
first commitment period. There are no restrictions on their 
use. Those units add to a total impact of 0.2 GtCO
2
e in 2020.
2.4.3 The potential impact of offsets
Offsets could affect the emissions levels associated 
with the pledges in two ways. First, double counting of 
offsets could arise where emission reductions in developing 
countries achieved through offsets, such as certified emission 
reductions, are counted towards meeting the pledges of 
both countries. Second, some of the offsets may actually not 
achieve the intended, additional emission reductions.
It is clear that emission reductions associated with ‘emission 
reduction units’ and ‘certified emission reductions’ or with 
the Kyoto Protocol’s third flexible mechanism – emissions 
trading, should not be double counted26. Nevertheless, 
rules for avoiding double counting have not been agreed 
to. A rough estimate of the impact of double counting is as 
follows. If all parties’ offsets were counted twice – a likely 
overestimate of double counting – global emissions would 
be 0.40 GtCO
2
e higher in the case of conditional pledges, 
and 0.55 GtCO
2
e higher in the case of unconditional pledges. 
In the 2012 emissions gap report (UNEP, 2012a) double 
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counting was estimated at 1.5 GtCO
2
e, which is now believed 
to be an overly high value27.
In addition to double counting, there is a risk that more 
offset credits could be generated than emissions actually 
reduced. Stated differently: project activities need to 
be additional to the development expected without the 
project28. Although estimates are fraught with uncertainty, 
available evidence suggests that a significant amount of 
emission reductions in Clean Development Mechanism 
projects are not additional in this sense (Alexeew et al., 
2010; Michaelowa, 2009; Schneider, 2009). Assuming this 
share to be 25 percent by 2020, it is estimated that offsets of 
up to 0.1 GtCO
2
e for conditional pledges and 0.15 GtCO
2
e for 
unconditional pledges could be non-additional. This would 
raise the total estimate of the impact of offsets to about 0.5–
0.7 GtCO
2
e. Assuming a much lower share of 10 percent by 
2020, the impact of offsets would be 0.5–0.6 GtCO
2
e.
2.4.4 Four cases of expected emissions in 2020
The findings from 12 modelling groups have been 
brought together to estimate expected emission levels in 
2020, taking into account emission reduction proposals by 
parties to the Climate Convention. For more information 
on the contributing modelling groups, see Table B.1 in 
Appendix 2.B.
Of the seven modelling groups that participated in 
the 2012 emissions gap report, most have updated their 
analyses29, and five new modelling groups contributed to 
this year’s update30.
In line with the 2012 report (UNEP, 2012a), the current 
update is structured around four emission scenarios in 2020, 
based on whether pledges are conditional or unconditional, 
and on whether accounting rules are strict or lenient 
(Figure 2.3). Under strict rules the allowances from LULUCF 
accounting, offset double counting, and surplus emission 
credits cannot be counted towards the emission reduction 
pledges. Under lenient rules this is permitted.
The results for each of the four scenarios are given below. 
Ranges are expressed as 20th–80th percentiles.____________________
27 The 1.5 GtCO
2
e estimate was taken from Erickson et al.(2011). However, given 
current BaU projections, the agreed limited use of Clean Development Mechanism 
and other transferable units for the countries not participating in the Kyoto 
Protocol’s CP2, and since the USA and Canada are not planning to use offsets, 
0.40 GtCO
2
e (in the conditional pledge cases) and 0.55 GtCO
2
e (in the 
unconditional pledge cases) are now believed to be more accurate estimates. For 
the pledge cases it is assumed that international emission offsets could account for 
33 percent of the difference between BAU and pledged emission levels by 2020 for 
all Annex I countries. (This is an arbitrary, conservative estimate, as many parties 
have yet to specify any limits to the use of transferable units.) Two exceptions are 
made, however. First, no offset use for the USA and Canada is assumed, because 
their respective governments have indicated that they will only make very limited 
use of offset credits (UNFCCC, 2012c). Second, regarding the European Union’s 
unconditional pledge, the rules in the European Union’s energy and climate 
package are assumed to have been implemented.
28 A criterion sometimes applied to projects aiming at reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions. It stipulates that the emission reductions accomplished by the 
project would not have happened anyway if the project had not taken place.
29 More specifically, (i) Climate Action Tracker by Ecofys, Climate Analytics and 
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, PIK, www.climateactiontracker.
org (Climate Action Tracker, 2010); (ii) Climate Interactive (C-ROADS) (Sterman 
et al., 2012); (iii) Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) (Tavoni et al., 2013); (iv) 
Grantham Research Institute, London School of Economics (updated based on 
Stern and Taylor, 2010); (v) OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050 (OECD, 2012); 
(vi) PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (den Elzen et al., 2013a; 
Hof et al., 2013) and (vii) UNEP Risoe Centre (UNEP, 2012b).
30 The five new modelling groups are: Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands 
(ECN), International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), National 
Institute for Environmental Studies (NIES), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
(PNNL) and Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK). Additional 
information on the participants in the project (dubbed LIMITS) is given in Appendix 
2.B. Kriegler et al. (2013) summarises some of the project’s findings.
Case 1 – Unconditional pledges, lenient rules
Parties implement their lower-ambition pledges and are 
subject to lenient accounting rules: the median estimate 
of annual greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 is 56 GtCO
2
e, 
within a range of 54–56 GtCO
2
e. 
Case 2 – Unconditional pledges, strict rules
Parties implement their lower-ambition pledges, but are 
subject to strict accounting rules: the median estimate of 
annual greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 is 55 GtCO
2
e, 
within a range of 53–55 GtCO
2
e. 
Case 3 – Conditional pledges, lenient rules
Some parties offered to be more ambitious with their 
pledges, provided some conditions were met. If the more 
ambitious conditional pledges are implemented, and 
accounting rules are lenient, the median estimate of annual 
greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 is 54 GtCO
2
e, within a 
range of 52–54 GtCO
2
e.
Case 4 – Conditional pledges, strict rules
Parties implement higher-ambition pledges and are subject 
to strict accounting rules: the median estimate of annual 
greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 is 52 GtCO
2
e, within a 
range of 50–52 GtCO
2
e.
Compared to the 2012 update (UNEP, 2012a), emission 
levels in 2020 corresponding to the two cases for 
which strict rules apply are higher by around 1 GtCO
2
e 
under unconditional pledges and comparable with the 
corresponding estimate in the 2012 update for conditional 
pledges. The remaining two cases, those in which lenient 
rules apply, have median emissions that are around 
1 GtCO
2
e lower compared to the 2012 update. The latter is 
due to the lower impact of both double counting and surplus 
assigned amount units due to the Doha decisions and does 
not reflect an increase in ambition or action, but represent 
a move towards stricter accounting rules. To illustrate, in 
last year’s emissions gap report, emission levels associated 
with the strict-rules cases were 3 GtCO
2
e lower than those of 
the lenient-rules cases, whereas this year they are lower by 
around 1 GtCO
2
e (unconditional) and 2 GtCO
2
e (conditional).
Including five additional modelling groups has increased 
the robustness of the analysis. Despite the inclusion of these 
five new studies, the overall conclusions have not changed. 
2.4.5 Pledged reduction effort by Annex I and 
non-Annex I countries
For Annex I parties, total emissions as a group of countries 
for the four pledge cases are estimated to be 3–16 percent 
below 1990 levels in 2020. For non-Annex I parties, total 
emissions are estimated to be 7–9 percent lower than 
business-as-usual emissions. This implies that the aggregate 
Annex I countries’ emission goals fall short of reaching the 
25–40 percent reduction by 2020, compared with 1990, 
suggested in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (Gupta et 
al., 2007). Similarly, the non-Annex I countries’ goals fall, 
collectively, short in reaching the 15–30 percent deviation 
from business-as-usual which is also used as a benchmark 
for emission reductions (den Elzen and Höhne, 2008; 2010). 
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Figure 2.3 Emissions in 2020 under BaU and as a result of pledges under four cases.
Note: To ensure a consistent comparison of the pathways and pledges the data have been harmonized to the same 2005 emissions 
of 45 GtCO
2
e, except for Grantham. 
Source: See Appendix 2.B.
2.5 National progress: do policies match 
pledges?
Section 2.4 examined four scenarios for national and 
global greenhouse gas emissions assuming that parties’ 
pledges would be fully implemented – that is, assuming 
that, in 2020, parties will emit the amount indicated by their 
pledges. As 2020 approaches, however, the time is ripe to 
take stock of the extent to which parties are, in fact, on track 
to achieve their pledges.
This section considers the likely impact of current domestic 
policies, describing parties’ climate-policy portfolios and 
examining the extent to which these policies, in combination 
with other factors, have put parties on track to meeting 
their pledges. The section focuses on the 13 parties whose 
economies are amongst the 20 largest in the world and who 
have formulated a quantitative pledge31.
It is important to note that the 13 parties’ pledges varied 
in terms of the extent to which they required deviation 
from various BaU estimates, as discussed in Appendix 2.D. 
The larger the deviation, the more difficult it is to achieve 
the pledge and the more important the role of additional 
policies becomes.
In order to assess whether parties’ expected greenhouse 
gas trajectories are in line with 2020 pledges, projected 2020 
emission scenarios that take into account currently adopted 
policies (current trajectory for 2020) were compared to the 
2020 emission levels needed to achieve each pledge through 
domestic abatement (pledge threshold for 2020)32.
____________________
31 These parties account for 72 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions. They 
are: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Mexico, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the Republic of Korea and the USA.
____________________
32  We consider offsets only when a country has explicitly stated its intent to 
purchase a specific quantity of offsets.
33 This contrasts with the BaU ranges presented in earlier sections of this report, 
which include estimates that do not factor in these effects.
To establish the current trajectory for 2020, we identified 
emission scenarios that factor in the effects of currently 
adopted policies33. We based this trajectory on official 
estimates presented in national communications to the 
Climate Convention and other government sources, and 
corroborated these estimates with other available literature 
(Table 2.1), adjusting where necessary to ensure consistency 
with official figures, for example, in the treatment of LULUCF. 
An official trajectory was not available for the Republic 
of Korea.
To establish the pledge threshold, we sought to identify 
the maximum level of 2020 emissions that each party would 
consider to be consistent with meeting its pledge through 
domestic abatement. Where a pledge is presented as a 
range, we adopted the higher quantity of resulting emissions 
as the pledge threshold – for example, if a country states 
it will reduce its emissions by 5–10 percent, our pledge 
threshold represents the 5 percent reduction. Note, if 10 
percent were used, countries would have lower expected 
emissions in 2020. 
For each of the 13 parties examined, Table 2.1 below 
presents both official and independent estimates of 
emission levels in 2020. Five parties – Australia, China, the 
European Union, India and Russia – appear to be on track to 
meet their pledges under the policies they have adopted to 
date, given current assumptions about macroeconomic and 
technology trends and offsets. Of these, three – China, India 
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Table 2.1 Pledges versus current trajectories for G20 countries with a greenhouse gas pledge37
party  – the Republic of Korea – may also require further 
action but this could not be verified based on government 
estimates. However, new actions now being taken by 
all five of these parties may enable them to meet their 
pledges, although the impact of these actions have not been 
analyzed here. Examples of new actions include Mexico 
which has recently adopted comprehensive climate-change 
legislation, and is in the process of developing its second 
special programme on climate change (NCCS, 2013)36. 
____________________
34 Regardless of whether China and India needed new policies to meet their 
greenhouse gas-intensity pledges, both countries have implemented significant 
new climate-related policies since 2009.
35 Australia has announced its intent to meet its pledge half through domestic 
abatement under its new carbon-pricing mechanism and half through 
internationally sourced offsets – 100 MtCO
2
e each (DCCEE, 2012). Australia’s new 
coalition government, however, has announced its intent to repeal the carbon-
pricing mechanism; while there is bipartisan support for Australia’s pledge, it is 
not clear how Australia would deliver on the pledge without the carbon-pricing 
mechanism (Kember et al., 2013).
and Russia – had pledges that, by some estimates, were less 
dependent on policy interventions after 200934. Australia 
and the European Union, on the other hand, needed to 
strengthen their policy portfolios and, in Australia’s case, 
purchase offsets to meet their unconditional pledges35.
Four parties – Canada, Japan, Mexico, and the USA – may 
require further action and/or purchased offsets to meet 
their pledges, according to government and independent 
estimates of projected national emissions in 2020. A fifth 
____________________ 
36  It is not yet possible to quantify the abatement expected from the new special 
programme on climate change.
37 Not considering purchase or sale of offsets. Figures include all gases and sectors, 
including LULUCF, unless otherwise noted.
Party Pledge 
threshold 
for 2020 
(MtCO
2
e)
Pledge           
estimate from 
this study 
(Figure 2.2)
Current trajectory for 2020 
(MtCO
2
e)
Observation Notes and references
Official 
estimate
Independent 
estimate(s)
Australia 537 427–541 637 475–645 Australia intends to meet 
its unconditional 5 percent 
pledge in part through 
domestic abatement and 
in part by purchasing               
100 MtCO
2
e in offsets. 
Australia is experiencing sig-
nificant policy uncertainty.
Pledge threshold and official 
trajectory from DCCEE (2012); 
independent trajectory from 
Roelfsema et al. (2013).
Brazil 2 068 1 973-2 068 N/A 1 500–2 630 Estimates of 2020 emissions 
vary widely above 
and below the pledge             
threshold, approximately  
1 900 MtCO
2
e (La Rovere et 
al., 2013) and 1500 – 2630 
MtCO
2
e (Roelfsema et al., 
2013). 
Pledge threshold based on 
Brazilian Government (2010); 
independent trajectory from La 
Rovere (2013) and Roelfsema et 
al. (2013).
Canada 607 614 720 730–780 According to current projec-
tions, Canada will require 
further policy action and/
or the purchase of offsets to 
meet its pledge.
Pledge threshold and official 
trajectory from Environment 
Canada (2012); independent 
trajectory from Roelfsema et al. 
(2013).
China 11 700 
(CO
2
 only)
13 445-13 561 
(all 
greenhouse 
gases)
11 700 
(CO
2
 only)
12 770–14 765 
(all 
greenhouse 
gases)
Most estimates indicate that 
China is currently on track 
to meet its CO
2
 intensity 
pledge, which was similar 
to some BaU estimates 
(though not to China’s).
Pledge threshold from 
Roelfsema et al. (2013); official 
trajectory from The People’s 
Republic of China (2012); 
independent trajectory from 
Roelfsema et al. (2013); figures 
assume 7 percent GDP growth 
and include only CO
2
 emissions 
from energy and industry.
European 
Union 
(EU27)
4 526 3 935–4 479 4 500 4 500 According to current 
projections, the European 
Union is currently on 
track to meet its 20 
percent unconditional 
pledge through domestic 
abatement.
Pledge threshold from UNFCCC 
(2012d); official trajectory from 
European Environment Agency 
(2012); independent trajectory 
from Roelfsema et al. (2013); 
excludes LULUCF.
India 3 537–4 016 3 751-3 834 3 537–4 016 2 655–3 795 Most estimates indicate that 
India is currently on track 
to meet its greenhouse 
gas intensity pledge, which 
is higher than some BaU 
estimates. 
Pledge threshold and official 
trajectory from Planning 
Commission (2011) (figures 
assume 8 and 9 percent 
GDP growth, respectively); 
independent trajectory from 
Roelfsema et al. (2013). Figures 
exclude agriculture and LULUCF.
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Party Pledge 
threshold 
for 2020 
(MtCO
2
e)
Pledge median 
estimate from 
this study 
(Figure 2.2)
Current trajectory for 2020 
(MtCO
2
e)
Observation Notes and references
Official 
estimate
Independent 
estimate(s)
Indonesia 2 183 1 603–1 820 N/A N/A Indonesia has not published 
estimates of its projected 
2020 emissions taking into 
account current policies, 
and independent estimates 
factor out the sizable share 
of national emissions 
from peatlands, due to 
the significant uncertainty 
associated with estimating 
these.
Pledge threshold based on 
Ministry of Environment (2010).
Japan 946 952 1 148–1 198 N/A According to official 
estimates, Japan is on track 
to achieve a 5–9 percent 
reduction from 1990 levels, 
with high uncertainty; 
the Japanese government 
intends to revise its 2020 
target by late 2013 (GWPH 
2013). 
Pledge calculated based on 
Ministry of Environment (2013) 
using Kyoto Protocol Base Year. 
Official trajectory based on The 
Energy and Environment Council 
(2012).
Mexico 672 672 830 800–845 According to current 
projections, Mexico will 
require further action 
and/or offsets to meet its 
pledge. New or enhanced 
policies included in the 
forthcoming Special 
Programme on Climate 
Change may reduce 
projected 2020 emissions. 
Official pledge based on         
NCCS (2013); official trajectory        
based on Government of    
Mexico (2012), adjusted per 
NCCS (2013); independent 
trajectory from Roelfsema et al. 
(2013).
Republic 
of Korea
543 543 N/A 630–675 Information on the Republic 
of Korea’s emission 
trajectory is limited; 
independent estimates 
indicate that further action 
and/or offsets will be 
needed to meet the pledge. 
The Republic of Korea 
is currently developing 
new policies, including an 
emission-trading scheme.
Pledge threshold based on 
the Republic of Korea (2011); 
current trajectory from 
Roelfsema et al. (2013); excludes 
LULUCF.
Russian 
Federation
2 921 2 515–2 763 2 750 2 085–2 455 Russia is currently on track 
to meet its pledge, which 
was above BaU estimates.
Pledge threshold based on 
Russian Federation (2013); 
official trajectory from 
Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Environment (2010); 
independent trajectory from 
Roelfsema et al. (2013).
South 
Africa
583 479 N/A 560–690 South Africa has not 
published estimates of its 
projected 2020 emissions, 
and independent estimates 
based on currently adopted 
policies are not available.
Pledge threshold from  
Department of Environmental 
Affairs (2011); independent 
trajectory from Roelfsema et aI. 
(2013).
USA 5 144 5 974 6 206 6 041–6 465 According to current 
projections, the USA will 
require further action 
and/or offsets to meet its 
pledge. New or enhanced 
policies pursued under 
the Climate Action Plan 
announced in June 2013 
may reduce projected 2020 
emissions.
Pledge threshold based on EPA 
(2013); official trajectory from 
United States Department of 
State (2010); independent 
trajectory from Bianco et al. 
(2013) (with LULUCF adjusted 
per US Department of State 
(2010) and Roelfsema et al. 
(2013)).
Notes: 
- Pledge threshold for 2020 refers to 2020 emission levels needed to achieve each pledge through domestic abatement.
- Current trajectory for 2020 provides scenario projections that factor in the effects of currently adopted policies. Where governmental sources 
are available, these are cited first (official estimates). Independent estimates are quoted next to these, for comparison.
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The Republic of Korea is about to implement an 
emissions-trading scheme and is defining other elements 
of its Framework Act on Low Carbon38. The USA presented 
a Climate Action Plan in June 2013 (Executive Office of the 
President, 2013), and analysis has shown that it is possible for 
the USA to deliver on its pledge if the administration makes 
full use of available legal instruments (Bianco et al. 2013), 
many of which are referenced in the Climate Action Plan. 
A 2012 study concluded that Canada’s 2020 goal was still 
achievable if Canada were to implement specific additional 
policies, though it would become more costly and difficult to 
achieve the longer further action was delayed (NRTEE 2012). 
Japan is currently in the process of  reviewing both its pledge 
and its policy portfolio in light of the Fukushima nuclear 
incident and a recent government transition (GWPH, 2013).
While the three remaining countries, Brazil, Indonesia 
and South Africa, have all made significant progress on 
monitoring and reporting in recent years, for a variety of 
reasons insufficient information is currently available to
determine whether they are on track to achieve their 
pledges. These countries’ governments have not published 
estimates of their 2020 emissions that consider only currently 
adopted policies, and independent assessments (Roelfsema 
et al., 2013) present a wide range of possible trajectories. 
Indeed, some of these countries’ climate policies are 
rapidly evolving, making it difficult to develop meaningful 
estimates of future emissions – South Africa, for example, is 
considering a carbon tax and a range of additional measures. 
Emission trajectories for Brazil and Indonesia are subject 
to considerable uncertainty related to land-use emissions 
(Roelfsema et al., 2013). As policies continue to evolve, the 
forthcoming Biennial Reports and Biennial Update Reports 
of 2014 to the Climate Convention can serve as one option 
for parties to take stock of, and quantify, their progress, and 
to communicate this internationally. 
2.6 Summary
If country pledges are implemented, expected emission 
levels in 2020 will range from 52 to 56 GtCO
2
e, depending 
on how pledges are implemented – for reference, the BaU 
level is 59 GtCO
2
e. The factors affecting implementation 
are whether the pledges are conditional or unconditional, 
and whether the accounting rules applied are lenient or 
strict. According to best estimates presented in this chapter, 
global greenhouse gas emissions are expected to continue 
to increase. Estimated BaU emissions are 1 GtCO
2
e higher 
compared to last year’s update. While emission projections 
in 2020 for the two strict rules cases are comparable with last 
year’s update, the Doha decisions on surpluses, as well as 
our downward revisions on the impact of double counting, 
lower the emission levels associated with the lenient rules 
cases by roughly 1 GtCO
2
e.
Global 2020 emissions resulting from the implementation 
of pledges can be lowered by moving from unconditional to 
conditional pledges, and from lenient accounting rules to 
strict accounting rules. For example, if conditional pledges 
were embraced instead of unconditional ones, emission 
levels in 2020 would be 2–3 GtCO
2
e lower. If strict rules 
were adopted rather than lenient ones, emissions levels in 
2020 would be 1–2 GtCO
2
e lower. It is noteworthy that the 
decisions on surplus assigned amount units in Doha have 
lowered the emission levels under the lenient rule cases by 
1 GtCO
2
e.
For these figures to hold true, parties must also deliver on 
their pledges, which in some cases may require additional 
policies or purchased offsets. Five of the 13 major parties 
are well positioned to achieve their pledges using policies 
they have already adopted, enhancing confidence in the 
pledge scenarios outlined in the previous section. Of the 
five parties that may not yet be so positioned, all are within 
striking distance of achieving their pledges in 2020. Three, in 
particular, have taken significant steps to enhance their policy 
portfolios, which could lead to the ambitious policies needed 
to meet their pledges. It should be noted that some parties 
have defined their pledges at a higher level of emissions 
than those used to calculate the size of the gap in this report. 
Moreover, even those parties that have adopted ambitious 
policies may find it difficult to meet their pledges, owing to 
political circumstances, implementation shortcomings, and 
potentially adverse macroeconomic trends. Therefore, it will 
be important to monitor and, where possible, take steps to 
mitigate these risk factors.
Finally, serious information gaps preclude a 
comprehensive assessment of several countries’ emission 
trajectories under current policies. Given the disconnect 
that can occur between country pledges and the policies that 
support them, it is imperative to address this information 
gap in order to fully understand the magnitude of the gap 
between countries’ policy portfolios and the 2o C target.
____________________ 
38 No official government estimate is available that concludes that the Republic of 
Korea is not on track to meet its pledge. However, since independent estimates 
point towards emission levels that are largely inconsistent with those required 
to meet the pledge, and given that the government of the Republic of Korea is 
currently developing new, aggressive policies including an emissions trading 
scheme, it is likely that the country is indeed not yet on track to meet its pledge 
through current policies. The new policies being developed may reverse this 
situation.
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The emissions gap and its 
implications
Chapter 3
3.1 Introduction
Countries have pledged to reduce or limit their greenhouse 
gas emissions by 2020 and at the same time have agreed to 
limit the increase in global mean temperature to 1.5° C or 
2° C compared to pre-industrial levels. These two important 
commitments raise some critical questions:
-	 Does the combined effect of these pledges put the 
world on a path towards limiting warming to below 
1.5° C or 2° C with a high chance of success?
-	 Is there an emissions gap between where the pledges 
lead and where pathways indicate emissions should 
ideally be?
-	 What are the implications and trade-offs of such a 
possible emissions gap for the achievability of the 
1.5° C and 2° C targets and their associated mitigation 
challenges?
Earlier emissions gap reports have set out to answer 
these questions by combining the assessment of where 
emissions are heading (Chapter 2) with an assessment of 
emission scenarios that could limit warming to below 1.5° C 
or 2° C (see Appendix 3.A for background). The assessment 
is updated here, as it has been annually since 2010 (UNEP, 
2010; 2011; 2012).
UNEP’s 2012 report mentioned a new class of scenario, 
termed later-action scenarios, that limit warming 
to 1.5° C or 2° C. The special aspect of these is that they 
allow the achievement of climate targets even though 
global emissions in the near term, up to 2020, are higher 
than in scenarios based on immediate action. In this 2013 
report we take advantage of the many new articles that 
have been published on later-action scenarios and examine 
their implications and their assumptions much more closely 
(Sections 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6).
3.2 Which scenarios are analyzed?
The scientific literature contains many different emission 
scenarios computed by integrated assessment models that 
limit global temperature rise to 1.5° C or 2° C above pre-
industrial levels (Appendix 3.B). The differences between 
scenarios arise from the range of assumptions made about 
inputs such as costs, potential and performance of different 
mitigation technologies, as well as driving forces of emissions 
such as economic and population growth. Also important 
are differences in model design and the design of model 
experiments. The scenarios highlighted in this chapter stay, 
respectively, within the 1.5° C or 2° C targets with a certain 
probability but can differ significantly in their underlying 
assumptions. We also present a re-analysis of the scenario 
literature, where the scenarios have been divided into two 
groups: least-cost and later-action.
Least-cost scenarios depict the trend in global emissions 
up to 2100 under the assumption that climate targets will be 
met by the cheapest combination of policies and measures 
over the time period considered by a particular model. This 
assumes that, in the model, actions are allowed to begin 
immediately; that is, in the specified base year of the model’s 
calculations, which is often 2010. This set of scenarios can 
be seen as a useful benchmark for evaluating implications 
of less stingent climate policies. As discussed below, the fact 
that real emissions since 2010 already deviate from these 
pathways has important implications.
Later-action scenarios also attempt to keep warming to 
below 1.5° C or 2° C, but assume that actions to reduce 
emissions are generally weaker and take place later than 
assumed in least-cost scenarios. Hence, later-action 
scenarios assume that less action is taken to reduce 
emissions in the near term as compared to least-cost 
scenarios (Section 3.5). Although less action is assumed, it 
might, for example, include complying with current pledges 
to reduce emissions. The set also includes scenarios that have 
no policy action at all in some or all regions until 2030. After 
Lead authors : Gunnar Luderer (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Germany), Joeri Rogelj (ETH Zurich, Switzerland), Roberto 
Schaeffer (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil)
Contributing authors: Rob Dellink (OECD, France), Tatsuya Hanaoka (National Institute for Environmental Studies, Japan), Kejun Jiang 
(Energy Research Institute, China), Jason Lowe (MetOffice, United Kingdom), Michiel Schaeffer (Climate Analytics, USA), Keywan Riahi 
(International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria), Fu Sha (National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International 
Cooperation, China), Detlef P. van Vuuren (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Netherlands)
The Emissions Gap Report 2013 – The emissions gap and its implications14
2020 or 2030, the later-action scenarios aim for more stringent 
policies to ensure compatibility with the temperature 
targets. In other words, the lack of ambition to reduce 
emissions in the short term is compensated by faster and/or 
deeper emission reductions later. Once these scenarios do 
begin emission reductions, they again attempt to minimize 
costs of mitigation, but some options are no longer available. 
By definition the later start will lead to higher overall costs.
Each of these scenarios has a particular trajectory of 
emissions. The reason a particular trajectory keeps within a 
specified limit of global warming – during the 21st century 
or in a certain year in the future – is that it stays below a 
certain maximum value of cumulative emissions of long-
lived greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide and nitrous 
oxide (Allen et al., 2009; IPCC, 2013; Matthews et al., 2012; 
Meinshausen et al., 2009; Solomon et al., 2010)1. Integrated-
assessment models provide insights into how, and at what 
rate, the global energy system and other greenhouse gas 
emitting sectors can be transformed so that cumulative 
emissions do not exceed a particular budget over the long 
term. Therefore they provide very useful information about 
what levels of emissions are consistent with temperature 
targets at different points in the future.
____________________
1 Some greenhouse gases such as methane and tropospheric ozone have a much 
shorter lifetime in the atmosphere than carbon dioxide or nitrous oxide, and are 
therefore sometimes called short-lived climate pollutants or forcers. As compared 
to carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide, the cumulative emissions of short-lived 
climate pollutants have a smaller effect on maximum temperature than their 
annual emissions at the time when maximum warming occurs (Smith et al., 2012).
____________________
2 In this chapter we refer to the 20th–80th percentile range as the central range or 
just as the range, while the minimum-maximum range is referred to as the full 
spread or just as the spread.
Box 3.1 Gap implications of the Working Group I Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC
The IPCC launched its fifth, and latest, assessment of climate science in September 2013 (IPCC, 2013). It emphasizes 
that the scientific community has a higher level of confidence than ever that human activity is significantly 
impacting the climate system.
A key aspect of the new IPCC Working Group I report is a quantification of the sensitivity of the climate system to 
increased greenhouse gas emissions and to radiative forcing. This sensitivity is expressed through several different 
metrics. The two most relevant for this report are the transient climate response (TCR) and the transient climate 
response to cumulative carbon emissions (TCRE).
The transient climate response is a measure of the temperature rise that occurs at the time of a doubling of 
carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere. Its current likely range is 1–2.5° C, compared to 1–3° C in the 
previous IPCC assessment. The climate simulations used in this report are consistent with this new range (Rogelj 
et al., 2012).
The transient climate response to cumulative carbon emissions is a measure of temperature rise per unit of 
cumulative carbon emissions, and has not been previously reported in an IPCC assessment. The implication of 
this concept is that global average temperature can only be kept to a certain value if cumulative carbon dioxide 
emissions do not exceed a maximum amount, or budget, over time. This is called the “carbon emissions budget”. 
The idea of a budget is that if emissions are high now, then they have to be lower later. In general, the budget total 
cannot be exceeded. If it were exceeded, carbon would have to be subsequently removed from the atmosphere so 
that emissions returned to within budget limits. Conversely, if emissions were lower at the beginning, then they can 
be somewhat higher later. Thus, different emission pathways staying within the same budget will meet the same 
temperature target. This explains the trade-off between early and late emission reductions. UNEP’s emissions gap 
reports explore these trade-offs by taking into account many important factors that influence emission trends.
3.3 Emissions in line with least-cost 2° C 
pathways
This section analyses emission levels achieved in least-
cost scenarios through comprehensive, immediate action. 
Implications of later-action scenarios are discussed in 
Sections 3.5 and 3.6. To analyze these scenarios, we bring 
them into a common analytical framework and estimate 
the probability of each scenario exceeding 1.5° C or 2° C of 
warming. A probabilistic approach is important because of the 
uncertainties of climate response (see Box 3.1). Probability 
statements in this chapter only refer to climate-response 
uncertainties (see Appendix 3.A for more information), not 
to the plausibility of particular policy outcomes.
Least-cost emission scenarios consistent with a ‘likely’ 
chance of staying below 2° C have a median emission level 
of 44 GtCO
2
e per year in 2020, with a central range of 
38–47 GtCO
2
e per year – dependent on their post-2020 
emission trajectories (Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1)2. For 
comparison, emissions in 2005 were 45 GtCO
2
e per year. In 
this and previous emission-gap reports, we define a ‘likely’ 
chance as having a greater than 66 percent probability, 
consistent with the definitions of the IPCC (Mastrandrea 
et al., 2010). For a less stringent ‘medium’ chance 
(50–66 percent), median emission levels in 2020 can 
be somewhat higher at 46 GtCO
2
e per year (range 
44–48 GtCO
2
e per year). Global emissions in these scenarios 
peak around 2020 or earlier.
The main results do not differ from those presented in the 
2012 report (UNEP, 2012), because most new scenarios also 
initiate comprehensive action from 2010 onward and near-
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____________________
3 In this case optimal means following a least-cost pathway.
____________________
4 Negative emissions in this case refer to negative emissions from the fossil fuel 
and industrial sectors. Land-use emissions are not included here in the calculation 
of negative emissions. For the subset of scenarios that do not reach net negative 
emissions in the long term, it was found that their median near-term emissions 
were about 4 GtCO
2
e per year in 2020 lower than the median of all least-cost 
scenarios that have a likely chance of staying below 2° C.
term mitigation potentials have not greatly changed in the 
past year. Least-cost scenarios are indicative of the emissions 
path the world would have followed if it had started to 
implement comprehensive policies at the beginning of this 
decade, and serve as an important benchmark to evaluate 
scenarios with delayed or weaker-than-optimal near-term 
policy actions3. The fact that we are currently not on this 
path already has implications (Section 3.6.2).
Median emissions in 2025 are around 40 GtCO
2
e per year 
(range 35–45 GtCO
2
e per year) in our set of scenarios which 
show a ‘likely’ chance of staying below the 2° C target. For 
a ‘medium’ chance of staying below the target, median 
2025 emissions do not exceed 44 GtCO
2
e per year (range 
42–46 GtCO
2
e per year). Continuing through the century, 
median emissions in line with the 2° C target continue to 
decline, for example to 35 GtCO
2
e per year and 22 GtCO
2
e 
per year in 2030 and 2050, respectively. (For scenarios with 
a ‘likely’ chance of meeting the 2° C target see Table 3.1).
The ranges are due to differences in assumptions of the 
integrated assessment models. Despite wide ranges, the 
models agree that substantial emission reductions relative 
to business-as-usual and current emission levels are required 
by 2050. Higher near-term emissions will have to be offset by 
steeper and larger reductions later. Moreover, many of the 
least-cost scenarios assume that emissions become negative 
in the second half of the century. This raises the question of 
the feasibility of negative emissions. Negative emissions are 
achieved in these scenarios through bio-energy and carbon 
capture and storage (CCS), or through land-use changes, 
such as afforestation or reforestation. In addition, negative 
emissions can be achieved, for instance, by direct air capture 
of carbon dioxide in combination with carbon capture and 
storage. Technologies such as bio-energy combined with 
carbon capture and storage are still not proven on the large 
scale and, moreover, their use can have significant impacts, 
for instance on biodiversity and drinking-water availability 
(Coelho et al., 2012). Some models, therefore, try to account 
for these impacts and explore the consequences of not being 
able to achieve negative emissions or the consequences 
of a much smaller bio-energy potential. It was found that 
scenarios that assumed that negative emissions cannot be 
achieved required substantially lower emissions in the short 
term in order not to exceed the carbon budget that complies 
with the 2° C target4. Around mid-century, the scenarios 
without net negative emissions have similar emission levels 
as other scenarios, while in the long term, by 2100 they are 
higher since the other scenarios have negative emissions.
In general, limiting the long-term mitigation potential in 
scenarios, by, for example, not allowing negative emissions, 
will require more stringent near-term emissions reductions 
(Table 3.1) and generally larger mitigation costs. Note that 
limiting key mitigation technologies in scenarios, including 
carbon capture and storage and bio-energy, will increase the 
overall mitigation costs because of the required additional 
short-term action, and because more expensive technologies 
will have to be used. Since these scenarios assume cost-
effective emission reductions from 2010 onward, they are 
included in our set of least-cost scenarios.
Table 3.1 Overview of emissions in 2020, 2025, 2030 and 2050 of scenarios with, respectively, a ‘likely’ (≥ 66 percent) or a 
‘medium’ (50–66 percent) chance of limiting global temperature increase to below 2° C during the 21st century.
Number 
of 
scenarios
Peaking 
decade*
Total greenhouse gas 
emissions in 2020
Total greenhouse gas 
emissions in 2025
Total greenhouse gas 
emissions in 2030
Total greenhouse gas 
emissions in 2050
year GtCO
2
e per year GtCO
2
e per year GtCO
2
e per year GtCO
2
e per year
Median Range and 
spread**
Median Range and 
spread **
Median Range and 
spread **
Median Range and 
spread **
‘Likely’ chance 
(≥ 66 percent) 
112 2010–2020 44 5–(38–47)–50 40 6–(35–45)–49 35 7–(32–42)–47 22 12–(18–25)–32
‘Medium’ chance 
(50–66 percent) 
66 2010–2020 46 24–(44–49)–53 44 28–(42–46)–54 41 32–(39–44)–55 28 21–(25–32)–44
Subset of scenarios with technology restrictions***
‘Likely’ chance 
(≥ 66 percent)
56 2010–2020 42 5–(37–37)–50 38 6–(32–44)–49 35 7–(28–40)–47 21 13–(18–24)–31
Subset of scenarios not achieving net negative emissions from fossil fuel and industry by 2100
‘Likely’ chance 
(≥ 66 percent)
42 2010–2020 40 5–(36–44)–50 37 6–(32–41)–47 34 7–(29–39)–47 20 13–(18–22)–27
* Because most models only provide emissions data for 5-year or 10-year intervals, the encompassing period in which the peak in global 
emissions occurs is given. The peak-year period here reflects the 20th–80th percentile range. With current emissions around 49–50 GtCO
2
e 
per year, a scenario with 2020 emissions below that value would in general imply that global emissions have peaked.
** The range and spread are presented as the minimum value – (20th–80th percentile) – maximum value.
*** Scenarios with technology restrictions explore the implications of a limited availability of mitigation options in the future, either because 
of societal choices to limit the use of certain technologies, or because technologies do not scale up as completely as currently anticipated.
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Figure 3.1 Ranges of scenarios limiting global temperature increase with a ‘likely’ (≥ 66 percent) chance of staying below various 
temperature limits (top panel). Time slices of the ranges are shown in the bottom panel for 2020 and 2050 global total emissions. 
The small box around 2020 indicates emission levels consistent with current pledges as assessed in Chapter 2.
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
Years
 
T<2˚C
2˚C<T<2.5˚C
2.5˚C<T<3˚C
3˚C<T<3.5˚C
3.5˚C<T<4˚C
4˚C<T<5˚C
T>5˚C
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1990 GHG level
2010 GHG level
20
20
 t
o
ta
l G
H
G
 e
m
is
si
o
n
 le
ve
ls
, G
tC
O
2e
 p
er
 y
ea
r
Likely (>66% probability) temperature increase during 21st century
<2˚C
<2.5˚C
<3˚C
<3.5˚C
<4˚C
<5˚C
>5˚C
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1990 GHG level
2010 GHG level
20
50
 t
o
ta
l G
H
G
 e
m
is
si
o
n
 le
ve
ls
, G
tC
O
2e
 p
er
 y
ea
r
-20
0
20
60
80
100
120
<2˚C
<2.5˚C
<3˚C
<3.5˚C
<4˚C
<5˚C
>5˚C
To
ta
l G
H
G
 e
m
is
si
o
n
 le
ve
ls
, G
tC
O
2e
 p
er
 y
ea
r
40
Likely (≥66%) temperature increase (T) during 21st century associated with emission pathways
The Emissions Gap Report 2013 – The emissions gap and its implications 17
3.4. Emissions in line with least-cost 1.5° C 
pathways
The 2010 Cancún Agreements include a provision for a 
possible 1.5° C limit on global mean temperature rise. The 
2012 report found five scenarios in line with 1.5° C, with 
at least a ‘medium’ probability, which showed average 
emissions not exceeding 43 GtCO
2
e per year in 2020 (UNEP, 
2012). Also, in 2010, UNEP found that stylized emission 
trajectories that start emission reductions in 2010 and stay 
within the 1.5° C target have average emissions of up to 
44 GtCO
2
e per year (range 39–44 GtCO
2
e per year) in 20205.
No new 1.5° C scenarios are analyzed in this report, as all 
new scenarios came from model inter-comparisons which 
focused on the 2° C target. However, some single-model 
studies have looked at the implications of later action for 
1.5° C. Scenarios from these studies were not included in the 
main scenario set, but are discussed below6.
Three new studies available in the scientific literature 
(Luderer et al., 2013b; Rogelj et al., 2013a; Rogelj et 
al., 2013b) and one report (Schaeffer et al., 2013b)
have looked explicitly at scenarios that limit warming to 
1.5° C by 2100. Azar et al. (2013) also looked at 1.5° C 
scenarios, but to 2150 instead of 2100. Least-cost scenarios 
from Rogelj et al. (2013b) have emissions between 
37–41 GtCO
2
e per year in 2020, 27–31 GtCO
2
e per year 
in 2030, and 13–17 GtCO
2
e per year in 2050 (Table 3.2)7. 
Mitigation in these scenarios starts after 2010 and is further 
tightened to limit warming below 1.5° C by 2100 with at least 
a 50 percent chance of achieving the target. These scenarios 
feature a radical commitment to energy efficiency in order 
to limit greenhouse gas emissions in the future. In addition, 
they rely heavily on negative-emission technologies such 
as bio-energy combined with carbon capture and storage 
(BioCCS). All three studies (Luderer et al., 2013b; Rogelj 
et al., 2013a; Rogelj et al., 2013b) show that immediate 
action is very important if warming is to be limited to below 
1.5° C by 2100. However, Rogelj et al. (2013a) also present 
later-action scenarios consistent with 1.5° C. These, which 
are discussed further in Sections 3.5 and 3.6, are able to limit 
warming below 1.5° C from emission levels higher than the 
ones cited above. On the basis of this (limited) information, 
and compared to the 2° C, the 1.5° C emissions gap in 2020 
is between 2 and 5 GtCO
2
e per year wider. 
 3.5 Later-action scenarios in the literature
Since the 2012 update (UNEP, 2012), several new studies 
of later-action scenarios have become available. These 
scenarios assume in the near term, up to 2020 or 2030, a 
lower level of action to reduce emissions than implied in 
the least-cost scenarios. All other assumptions being the 
same, the later-action scenarios have higher near-term 
emissions than least-cost scenarios. These scenarios assume 
that comprehensive emission reductions would begin 
at a later point, but are still able to stay within long-term 
climate targets.
Table 3.3 provides an overview of studies that have 
produced later-action scenarios. It is important to note 
that these studies cover a wide range of assumptions 
regarding the time at which comprehensive mitigation 
begins, and the nature of the climate-policy regime assumed 
for the early period until the adoption of comprehensive 
mitigation actions. Most studies consider scenarios in which 
comprehensive emission reductions are postponed until 
2020 or 2030 (Kriegler et al., 2013b; Luderer et al., 2013a; 
Luderer et al., 2013b; Riahi et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013a; 
Rogelj et al., 2013b). While some scenarios assume climate 
policies to be absent altogether in the near term, others 
incorporate the impact of current climate policies or their 
extensions. Some of these scenarios assume that current 
country emission pledges for 2020 are implemented. 
Compared to emissions in least-cost scenarios, emissions in 
the later-action scenarios are reduced more rapidly after the 
adoption of comprehensive mitigation actions in order to 
have at least a ‘medium’ chance of meeting the 2° C target.
____________________ 
5 Stylized emission scenarios are ones that are not computed with a detailed 
integrated assessment model, but by assuming an evolution of emission reduction 
rates throughout the century.
6 The reason for only including model inter-comparisons in the main scenario 
set is to achieve a somewhat balanced representation of the various modelling 
frameworks that are available in the scientific literature. Including particular 
single-scenario studies, which combined have produced more than 1 000 
scenarios, would bias the results presented here towards the results of one or two 
models. Therefore, these studies are discussed separately.  
7 Luderer et al. (2013b) found a range of 40–44 GtCO
2
e per year in 2020, 
28–36 GtCO
2
e per year in 2030 and 5-18 GtCO
2
e per year in 2050.
Table 3.2: Overview of characteristics of 1.5° C pathways available in the scientific literature. The ranges are drawn from the 
studies’ underlying information. 
Least-cost pathways
Temperature target Reference Scenario type Total greenhouse gas emissions, GtCO
2
e per year
in 2020 in 2030 in 2050
Limiting warming below 1.5° C 
with at least 50 percent chance
Rogelj et al. (2013b) Least cost 37–41 27–31 13–17
Limiting warming below 1.5° C  
with at least 50 percent chance
Luderer et al. (2013b) Least cost 40–44 28–36 5–18
Studies reporting implications of later action for limiting warming below 1.5° C
Rogelj et al. (2013a) Provides ranges of 2020 emissions from scenarios in line with a 50 percent chance to limit warming 
to below 1.5° C by 2100 (minimum-maximum spread 36–53 GtCO
2
e per year in 2020) and discusses 
the trade-offs and implications of later action.
Luderer et al. (2013b) Discusses the economic mitigation challenges – aggregate long-term cost, transitional costs, energy 
prices – of later action scenarios for a range of temperature targets, including 1.5° C, deriving 
implications for the lower end of achievable climate targets.
Rogelj et al. (2013b) Discusses the implications – carbon prices, aggregated mitigation costs, climate risks – of later action 
scenarios for a range of temperature targets, including 1.5° C, from a risk perspective, taking into 
account mitigation technology and energy demand variations. 
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Scenarios consistent with 1.5° C and 2° C targets have several similar characteristics. First, their emission-reduction 
rates throughout the 21st century are high – and both improvements in energy efficiency and the introduction 
of zero- and low-carbon emission technologies are often at rates faster than experienced historically over an 
extended period of time (van der Zwaan et al., 2013). Second, the scenarios typically reach their peak emission 
levels before or around 2020 in order to avoid an extensive overshoot of emission budgets, concentrations and, 
possibly, temperatures in the 21st century (Kriegler et al., 2013c). Third, the scenarios often have net negative 
emissions in the second half of the century. Finally, these scenarios almost universally feature an accelerated shift 
towards electrification (Krey et al., 2013). 
The 2012 report (UNEP, 2012) highlighted the potential role of both negative emissions and energy-efficiency 
measures. Negative emissions refers to the potential of actively removing more carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere than is emitted at a given period. Here we highlight new literature on the topics of both negative 
emissions and energy efficiency in scenarios that meet the 1.5° C and 2° C targets.
Negative emissions
About one third of the scenarios analyzed in this chapter with either a ‘likely’ or a ‘medium’ chance of meeting the 
2° C target – and most of the small number of 1.5° C scenarios – have negative total emissions of all Kyoto gases, 
not only carbon dioxide, before 2100. Moreover, about 40 percent of the scenarios that have a likely chance of 
complying with the 2° C target have negative energy and industry-related carbon dioxide emissions by 2100. In 
these scenarios, bio-energy with carbon capture and storage is usually applied in the second-half of the century, 
assuming this option is economically attractive within a least-cost path over time. Such a path implies that the 
discounted costs of an additional unit of reduction is stable over time, and thus allows for much more expensive 
technologies to expand in the second half of the century. Also considered economically attractive is the ability to 
avoid very rapid, and thus costly, emission reductions in the short term (Azar et al., 2010; Edmonds et al., 2013; 
van Vuuren et al., 2013). It should be noted that the application of bio-energy with carbon capture and storage 
is even more necessary in later-action scenarios, as well as in 1.5° C scenarios, because they need steeper and 
deeper cuts after 2020/2030 (Section 3.5).
Negative emissions can be achieved in several ways, including afforestation/reforestation, carbon dioxide storage 
in combination with direct air capture, and bio-energy in combination with carbon capture and storage (Tavoni 
and Socolow, 2013). The last option is often applied in model-based studies because of its attractive costs and 
overall potential. Still, the validity of assuming large-scale bio-energy with carbon capture and storage deployment 
crucially hinges on two key factors (UNEP, 2012; van Vuuren et al., 2013): 
-	 the technical and social feasibility of large-scale carbon capture and storage, for example, the development 
of a carbon capture and storage infrastructure; and
-	 the technical and social feasibility of sustainable large-scale bio-energy production, for example, the 
development of second-generation bio-energy conversion technologies, such as technologies for producing 
fuels from woody biomass. 
Even if both technologies are technically feasible and socially acceptable, the deployment of bio-energy with 
carbon capture and storage may have severe sustainability implications, for instance in terms of food-price 
developments and pressure on water resources. Many factors that may limit the availability of bio-energy are 
not fully represented in integrated-assessment models (Creutzig et al., 2012), and current integrated-assessment 
model estimates of the total mitigation potential vary greatly, sometimes by a factor of three (Tavoni and Socolow, 
2013). Importantly, integrated assessment models also show that stringent climate targets can be achieved 
without bio-energy with carbon capture and storage (Riahi et al., 2012). As noted previously, if scenarios do not 
rely on this in the future, significantly lower emissions are required in the near term. Conversely, high emissions 
in the near term lock in the need for negative emissions later (Section 3.6).
Energy efficiency
Energy-efficiency improvements also play a key role in the early phases of mitigation, since they provide relatively 
rapid returns on investment and require technologies less advanced than low-carbon options (IEA, 2012; Kainuma 
et al., 2012; van Vuuren et al., 2007). However, as costs of low-carbon technologies gradually decline, and the most 
cost-effective energy-efficiency improvements are exhausted, further efficiency improvements gradually play a 
smaller role (Krey et al., 2013). By contrast, although 1.5° C scenarios require the same type of technology options 
as 2° C scenarios, these might only be sufficient when they are combined with strong and sustained efficiency 
improvements (Luderer et al., 2013b; Rogelj et al., 2013a; Rogelj et al., 2013b). In general, across all temperature 
targets and technology options, energy efficiency improvements appear crucial in significantly reducing overall 
costs. Strong and sustained efficiency improvements can also be a hedge against the risk of other mitigation 
technology failures, which would preclude achieving stringent temperature targets (Luderer et al., 2013b; Riahi et 
al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013a).
Box 3.2 Key Properties of 1.5° C and 2° C Scenarios
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Table 3.3: Overview of later-action scenarios in the literature
3.6 The emissions gap: trade-offs and 
implications of today’s policy choices
3.6.1 The emissions gap
We now update the estimate of the emissions gap from 
previous reports. To do so we draw on the assessment of 
emission reduction pledges in Chapter 2, and the computed 
range of emissions from the analysis of least-cost scenarios in 
Section 3.3. As in previous reports, we define the emissions 
gap in 2020 as the difference between global emissions from 
least-cost scenarios that are consistent with the 2° C target 
and the expected global emissions implied by the pledges. 
Table 3.4 shows that, depending on the interpretation 
and implementation of the pledges, this gap ranges from 
8–12 GtCO
2
e per year in 2020 for having a ‘likely’ chance 
of staying below 2° C, and from 6–10 GtCO
2
e per year for 
having a ‘medium’ chance. As indicated earlier, a large 
number of least-cost scenarios assume implementation of 
climate policy from 2010 onwards. 
Certain later-action scenarios imply that in some cases 
current pledges could be compatible with the 2° C target, 
if a radical shift to stronger emission reductions is assured 
later – risks and trade-offs are discussed in Section 3.6.3. 
However, if these emission reductions do not materialize, 
then the 2020 emissions under the four pledge cases in 
Chapter 2 (52–56 GtCO
2
e per year), will be on a trajectory 
with a ‘likely’ chance of limiting warming to 3–4° C, not 2° C 
(Figure 3.1) 8.
3.6.2 Implications of the gap for achieving least-
cost 2020 emission levels
Our assessment shows that there is a gap in 2020 between 
the emission levels implied by the pledges and the emissions 
under a least-cost scenario consistent with limiting warming 
to below 2° C. It is important to note, however, that the 
least-cost scenarios assume that comprehensive emission 
reductions begin immediately after the base year, typically 
20109. We are now in 2013, and actual emission levels 
are above most least-cost scenarios, indicating that we 
have missed an opportunity to lower emissions in the 
cheapest way possible from the starting year 2010. As time 
progresses, more and more of the near-term emission 
reduction opportunities assumed in the least-cost scenarios 
might be lost, making it increasingly difficult to reach the 
initial least-cost 2020 emission levels. Some studies indicate 
it is still possible to close the gap by 2020 (Blok et al., 2012). 
However, as time passes, this comes with increasingly higher 
costs than indicated by the least-cost scenarios. The more 
real-world emissions deviate in the coming years from 
least-cost pathways, the greater the extra reduction efforts 
required for closing the gap in 2020 10.
 
3.6.3 Implications and trade-offs of not closing 
the gap
If the gap between global emissions from least-cost 
scenarios and global emissions implied by the pledges 
is not closed by 2020, then a later-action scenario has, 
effectively, been assumed for limiting global temperature 
increase to 1.5° C or 2° C. As noted previously, later-action 
scenarios are designed to investigate a delay of globally 
comprehensive reductions of emissions with comparatively 
lower near-term reductions. A number of recent studies 
Study Delay until Near-term climate policies
Model comparison studies 
AMPERE WP2 (Bertram et al., 2013; Eom et al., 2013; Riahi et al., 2013)
(9 participating models)
2030 Two higher-than-optimal interim 
emission targets for 2030.
AMPERE WP3 (Kriegler et al., 2013a) 
(11 participating models)
2030 Staged accession to international 
climate agreement.
LIMITS (Kriegler et al., 2013b)
(8 participating models)
2020, 2030 Weak and stringent interpretation of 
Copenhagen (UNFCCC COP15) pledges.
RoSE (Luderer et al., 2013a)
(3 participating models)
2020, 2030 Unconditional and lenient Copenhagen 
(UNFCCC COP15) pledges, and 
moderate reductions beyond 2020.
EMF-22 (Clarke et al., 2009)
(10 participating models)
2050 Staged accession to international 
climate agreement.
RECIPE (Jakob et al., 2012; Luderer et al., 2012)
(3 participating models)
2020 No climate policies or fragmented 
climate policies with different coalitions 
as first movers.
Single-model studies
van Vliet et al. (2012) 2020 Copenhagen (UNFCCC COP15) pledges.
OECD (2012) 2020 Copenhagen (UNFCCC COP15) pledges.
Rogelj et al. (2013a) 2020 Various higher-than-optimal interim 
emissions targets for 2020.
Rogelj et al. (2013b) 2020, 2030 No climate policies, except for efficiency 
measures.
Luderer et al. (2013b) 2020, 2030 Unconditional and lenient pledges, and 
moderate reductions beyond 2020.
____________________
8 Both least-cost and later-action scenarios require strong absolute emission 
reductions throughout the entire century. However, the stringency of emission 
reductions in least-cost scenarios – for example, in terms of the increase of 
discounted marginal abatement costs – is spread equally over time, starting from 
the base year.
____________________
9 Consistent with the first mentioning of a 2° C temperature limit under the Climate 
Convention (UNFCCC, 2010).
10 Denotes efforts both in terms of costs and actual reductions.
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(Kriegler et al., 2013b; Luderer et al., 2013a; Luderer et al., 
2013b; Riahi et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013a; Rogelj et al., 
2013b; van Vliet et al., 2012) show that such a choice implies 
important trade-offs.
On the one hand, later-action scenarios show short-term 
flexibility – they reduce the mitigation burden and associated 
costs in the near term, and move emission reduction 
requirements further into the future. This would give more 
time to build a global framework of ambitious policies, and 
for national policy makers to implement commensurate 
policies and measures. On the other hand, this short-term 
flexibility comes at the expense of stronger long-term 
requirements, reduced choices and higher risks of climate 
policy failure over the long term. Moreover, to meet the 
1.5° C target, there is much less flexibility to delay emission 
reductions in the coming years and mitigation requirements 
remain very stringent (Luderer et al., 2013b; Rogelj et 
al., 2013a). As discussed in Box 3.2, any climate  change 
mitigation scenario aiming at limiting warming to no more 
than 2° C or 1.5° C comes with major societal, economic 
and technological challenges. Recent studies with explicit 
focus on interim targets (Kriegler et al., 2013b; Luderer et 
al., 2013a; Luderer et al., 2013b; Riahi et al., 2013; Rogelj et 
al., 2013a) indicate that delays or less stringent near-term 
policies will exacerbate many of these challenges. The key 
impacts of later-action scenarios, and, by extension, of not 
closing the emissions gap, are:
Stronger medium-term emission reduction requirements. 
Higher near-term emissions imply more rapid emission 
reductions later on to stay within the carbon budget 
consistent with, for example, the 2° C target.
Lock-in to carbon-intensive and energy-intensive 
infrastructure. Unless credible, comprehensive and 
ambitious climate policies are put into place, the world 
will continue to expand its carbon- and energy-intensive 
infrastructure, and will not sufficiently incentivize the 
development and scale-up of climate-friendly technologies. 
Later-action scenarios delay the installment of such policies.
Reduced societal choices. The more modest the near-term 
emission reductions, the higher society’s dependence on 
specific technologies, thus foreclosing options and societal 
choices for the future. In particular, more scenarios depend 
on negative emissions to achieve the 2° C target.
Higher overall costs and economic challenges. Lower near-
term costs in later-action scenarios imply a lower burden on 
current economic growth but larger overall mitigation costs.
They also imply much higher economic challenges during the 
transition towards a comprehensive climate-policy regime, 
including substantial impacts on global economic growth 
and energy prices in the long term.
Higher climate risks. The risk that the world fails in its effort 
to limit global warming to 2° C or 1.5° C increases strongly 
with further delays of global action.
Stronger medium-term emission reduction 
requirements
As discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, limiting global 
warming to 1.5° C or 2° C implies a tight limit on cumulative 
greenhouse gas emissions. As a consequence, scenarios with 
higher emissions in the near term require stronger medium-
term mitigation to reach the same global average temperature 
over the long term. Inevitably, once comprehensive climate 
policies are finally introduced, emission reduction rates need 
to be greater than those in scenarios with strong near-term 
reductions. The AMPERE study found that modest emission 
reductions until 2030 imply that about 70 percent of the 
2010–2100 cumulative carbon-dioxide emissions budget for 
a medium chance of limiting warming below 2° C target will 
have been consumed by 2030 (Bertram et al., 2013; Riahi et 
al., 2013).
Least-cost scenarios that achieve the 2° C target take 
stringent action immediately to reduce emissions. Their rate 
of emission reductions over the medium term, 2030-2050, is 
around 2–4.5 percent per year11. Historically, such reductions 
have been achieved by individual countries (Peters et al., 
2013), but not globally.
By contrast, later-action scenarios delay stringent 
measures to reduce emissions, and consequently the annual 
rate of medium-term reductions needs to be much higher, 
around 6–8.5 percent in the case that emission reductions 
are modest until 2030 (Riahi et al., 2013), to meet the same 
target. Rogelj et al. (2013a) found similar results. Hence 
limiting the amount of mitigation over the next few years 
would require twice as fast a reduction in global emissions 
after 2030. It is important to note that these scenarios do not 
account for political and societal inertia, which could make 
such fast and radical emission reductions even more difficult 
to achieve if the change in policy comes unexpectedly (Riahi 
et al., 2013). A strong and reliable early policy signal is 
required in order to reduce emissions now, or have a chance 
of achieving higher ambition levels in the following decades.
Table 3.4 Assessment of the emissions gap between global emissions implied by the pledges and global emissions from least-
cost scenarios consistent with limiting warming below 2° C. The gap range is based on the 20th–80th percentile ranges of both 
the pledge and the scenario assessments. Values in parentheses are from last year’s report (UNEP, 2012).
BAU Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
What is the expected gap for a ‘likely’ chance of 
staying below 2° C?
Median 15 (14) 12 (13) 11 (10) 10 (11) 8 (8)
Range 9–19 7–15 6–14 5-13 3-11
(10–19) (9–16) (7–14) (7–15) (4–11)
What is the expected gap for a ‘medium’ chance of 
staying below 2° C?
Median 13 (12) 10 (11) 9 (8) 8 (9) 6 (6)
Range 8–16 6–12 5–11 4–10 2–8
(9–16) (8–13) (6–11) (6–12) (3–8)
____________________
11 Exponential reduction rates were used here. 
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Lock-in to carbon-intensive and energy-intensive 
infrastructure
Apart from having higher global emissions in the near term, 
later-action scenarios also have fewer options for reducing 
emissions later. This is because of carbon lock-in, that is, 
the continued construction of high-emission fossil-fuel 
infrastructure unconstrained by climate policies (Bertram et 
al., 2013; Luderer et al., 2013a; Rogelj et al., 2013a). As an 
example, some later-action scenarios in the AMPERE study 
have a 50 percent larger capacity of coal-fired power plants 
compared to current levels by 2030 (Bertram et al., 2013). 
The lack of near-term climate policies in these scenarios is 
also found to hinder the scaling up of low-emission, green-
energy technologies (Eom et al., 2013).
The same lock-in effect applies to lost opportunities for 
energy efficiency. The Global Energy Assessment (Riahi et 
al., 2012) shows the critical importance of energy-efficiency 
measures for limiting warming to below 2° C during the 
21st century, and similar findings are valid for returning 
warming to below 1.5° C (Luderer et al., 2013b; Rogelj et 
al., 2013a; Rogelj et al., 2013b). Later-action scenarios 
tend to further lock-in power plants, buildings and other 
infrastructure with low levels of energy efficiency. This 
makes the transition to a high-energy-efficiency future 
more difficult, and creates a greater demand for alternative 
emission reduction measures.
These lock-in effects can be reduced through an early 
policy signal as discussed above. For example, if power 
companies know for sure that stringent reductions will be 
required over the coming years, they might favour more in 
low-emissions infrastructure investments.
Reduced societal choices 
As stated earlier, later-action scenarios need to compensate 
for their higher near-term emissions with faster and deeper 
reductions later. Many later-action scenarios assume that 
a full portfolio of mitigation options is available, including 
technologies that are not yet proven on the large scale such 
as bio-energy combined with carbon capture and storage. 
When key future mitigation technologies do not become 
available, costs increase (Kriegler et al., 2013c). This increase 
was found to be bigger in later-action scenarios than in least-
cost scenarios (Luderer et al., 2013b; Riahi et al., 2013; Rogelj 
et al., 2013a; Rogelj et al., 2013b; van Vliet et al., 2012). If 
the range of future technological options is constrained, 
then the later-action scenarios were found to have higher 
mitigation costs and have a more difficult time complying 
with temperature targets than the least-cost scenarios. 
Furthermore, the more emission reductions are delayed, the 
greater the dependence on future technologies (Luderer et 
al., 2013b; Riahi et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013a)12. In other 
words, beginning emission reductions early, as is done in the 
least-cost scenarios, means that policymakers have a greater 
chance of meeting these temperature targets.
It is not only the availability of specific technologies, that 
is, an important factor in later-action scenarios, but also the 
pace at which they can be scaled up. For example, emissions 
under later-action scenarios have to be reduced very quickly 
and this requires very rapid decarbonization of the energy 
system, which in turn puts great pressure on society to 
rapidly deploy low-carbon technologies13.
Higher overall costs and economic challenges
Later-action scenarios show that a delay in beginning 
global comprehensive mitigation action increases the overall 
costs to reach a climate target (Clarke et al., 2009; Jakob 
et al., 2012; Kriegler et al., 2013b; Luderer et al., 2013a; 
Luderer et al., 2013b; OECD, 2012; Riahi et al., 2013; Rogelj 
et al., 2013b; Rogelj et al., 2013a). The larger the delay, the 
higher costs. Furthermore later-action scenarios clearly shift 
the burden of mitigation costs to later generations (Luderer 
et al., 2013b; OECD, 2012; Rogelj et al., 2013a)14.
The cost penalty of later action depends on when 
comprehensive mitigation actions finally begin, the 
magnitude of emission reductions up to that point, and the 
future availability of technologies15.
Later-action scenarios may also have higher economic 
costs during the transition from modest early actions to 
comprehensive mitigation actions (Kriegler et al., 2013b; 
Luderer et al., 2013a; Luderer et al., 2013b). For scenarios 
meeting the 2° C target, transitional economic costs 
increase strongly with further delay. For example, beginning 
comprehensive reductions after 2030, rather than after 2015, 
causes a three times greater effect of mitigation policies 
on economic growth in the decade after reductions begin 
(Luderer et al., 2013b), as in this case very rapid reductions 
are required beyond 2030 that can only be achieved through 
adopting high-cost mitigation measures.
Higher climate risks
Although later-action scenarios can reach the same 
temperature targets as their least-cost counterparts, later-
action scenarios pose greater risks of climate impacts for 
four reasons.
First, delaying action causes more greenhouse gases to 
build up in the atmosphere, thereby increasing the risk 
that the carbon emissions budget is exceeded for particular 
temperature targets. The risk comes from the fact that 
the steep reductions required later may not materialize. 
____________________
12 As an example of technological dependency, it was found that only two out 
of nine models in the AMPERE study could reach a long-term 450 ppm carbon-
dioxide concentration target, and thereby comply with the 2° C target, without 
scaling up carbon capture and storage (Riahi et al., 2013). A similar dependency 
is found for other mitigation technologies (Riahi et al., 2013; Rogelj et al., 2013b; 
Rogelj et al., 2013a).
____________________ 
13 Eom et al. (2013) find that the expansion of both nuclear power and solar 
photovoltaic (PV) installations in the 2030–2050 period increases by a factor of 
three when stringent emission reductions are delayed until 2030, as compared to 
when they are introduced immediately. 
14 For example, Rogelj et al. (2013a) found that mitigation costs between 2020 
and 2050 could be up to 20 percent higher in scenarios that meet the 2° C target 
if global emissions in 2020 are 56 GtCO
2
e per year instead of 44 GtCO
2
e per year. 
Global carbon reduction prices after 2020 are increased by about a factor of two 
or more. This translates into an increase of discounted costs between 2020 and 
2050 of more than US $7 trillion. Meanwhile, the cost of reducing emissions in the 
near-term, 2010–2020, was estimated to be about one third of this amount. When 
estimating cumulative mitigation costs over longer time frames, the medium to 
long-term economic effects appear to be relatively small because of discounting.
15 Note, however, that the costs of mitigation in least-cost scenarios can also vary 
widely depending on the set of mitigation technologies assumed to be available 
in the future.
16 For the case of staged accession to a global climate agreement aiming at 
stabilizing atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations at 450 ppm carbon-dioxide 
equivalent, Kriegler et al. (2013a) found that the risk of overshooting the 2° C limit 
might increase from around 30 to around 50 percent even if reluctant nations join 
later, since late-joiners might not be willing to compensate for their initially higher 
emissions. 
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This may happen because key technologies such as carbon 
capture and storage cannot be scaled up as expected. 
Equally likely is that future policy makers may be unwilling 
to take on the higher costs of mitigation16. Failure to steeply 
reduce emissions would cause a higher level of cumulative 
emissions than initially projected, and this would lead to 
higher eventual warming and a lower likelihood, or in some 
cases the impossibility, of staying below temperature targets 
(Meinshausen et al., 2009). As one example, Luderer et 
al. (2013b) found that delaying comprehensive mitigation 
actions beyond 2030 increases the achievable lower level 
of global temperature during the 21st century by about 
0.4° C as compared to a scenario with comprehensive 
reductions starting in 2020, in effect pushing the 2° C target 
out of reach.
Second, the risk of overshooting climate targets, both 
concentration and temperature, is higher (den Elzen et 
al., 2010; Rogelj et al., 2013a; Schaeffer et al, 2013a; van 
Vliet et al., 2012). Later-action scenarios have higher near 
term emissions than least-cost scenarios and this tends to 
increase the temporary overshoot of climate targets (Clarke 
et al., 2009; den Elzen et al., 2010; Kriegler et al., 2013a; 
Luderer et al., 2013a; Rogelj et al., 2013a; Schaeffer et al., 
2013a; van Vliet et al., 2012). Overshooting these targets, 
or extending the overshoot period, implies a greater risk 
of large-scale and possibly irreversible changes in the 
climate system (Lenton et al., 2008). The extent of the risk is 
very uncertain. 
Third, the rate of temperature increase in the near to 
medium term is higher (den Elzen et al., 2010; Schaeffer 
et al., 2013a; van Vliet et al., 2012) and this can imply an 
earlier onset of particular climate impacts and require 
more rapid adaptation. For example, based on results 
from 11 integrated-assessment models, Schaeffer et al. 
(2013a) found that later-action scenarios meeting the 2° C 
target have on average a 50 percent higher rate of decadal 
temperature increase in the 2040s than least-cost scenarios.
Fourth, when action is delayed, options to achieve 
stringent levels of climate protection are increasingly lost. All 
other factors being the same, each year of delay results in 
the steady loss of options to meet temperature targets with 
high probability (Luderer et al., 2013b; Rogelj et al., 2013b). 
Assuming that emission reductions begin in 2010, Rogelj et 
al. (2013b) found that some scenarios have more than a 50 
percent chance of limiting warming below 1.5° C. However, 
if comprehensive mitigation action is delayed until 2020, the 
probability sinks to 40–50 percent. If delayed until 2030, 
the probability sinks to 10–20 percent. Also, spending large 
sums on mitigation, by assuming a carbon price of about 
US $1 000 per tonne of carbon dioxide, cannot make up for 
these lost options.
3.6.4 Policy implications of the 2020 emissions 
gap and later-action scenarios
In Section 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, we have indicated that a 
large emissions gap continues to exist between least-
cost scenarios and the current emission pledges for 2020. 
The least-cost scenarios assessed in this report assume 
that climate policies are introduced from 2010 onwards. 
However, emission reductions in reality have not kept 
up with the least-cost paths. As a result, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to achieve the emission levels in 2020 
specified by least cost scenarios. This situation has inspired 
the research community to look into scenarios that explore 
the impact of later action. While such scenarios can lessen 
the necessity for short-term emission reductions they come 
with many additional costs and challenges. To avoid these 
costs, it is important to increase near term policy efforts 
aiming at reducing emissions by 2020, even if they do not 
reach the level of the least-cost scenarios. Without such 
efforts, the carbon-emission budgets consistent with keeping 
temperatures below 1.5° C or 2° C are exhausted rapidly, and 
mitigation challenges in the future are increased.
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Bridging the gap I: Policies for          
reducing emissions from agriculture
Chapter 4
4.1 Introduction
Bridging the emissions gap requires a substantial increase 
in ambition and action, as the previous chapters of this 
report have illustrated. In 2012, the UNEP Emissions Gap 
Report (UNEP, 2012) reviewed a number of policies in 
three sectors – building, transport and forestry – that are 
proving successful in substantially reducing emissions. In 
this report we review best-practice policies in agriculture, 
an often-overlooked emissions-producing sector. The sum 
of the policies from these different sectors, if replicated and 
scaled up, shows great potential for narrowing the emissions 
gap. Moreover, in many cases, these policies can help fulfil 
important national development objectives beyond climate 
goals as they can, depending on the policy, boost agricultural 
productivity, save costs of heating homes, promote eco-
tourism, reduce traffic congestion, abate air pollution and 
associated adverse health effects, or a combination of these.
Here we focus on agriculture because it is among the 
sectors most affected by climate change, while, at the 
same time, contributing a significant fraction of the world’s 
greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC, 2007a). Tubiello et al. 
(2013) recently estimated that in 2010 direct emissions 
from agriculture contributed to 10–12 percent of global 
greenhouse gas emissions, releasing 5.4–5.8 GtCO
2
e into 
the atmosphere. UNEP (2012) gave a best estimate of 
11 percent.
According to Bellarby et al. (2008) 38 percent of the 
emissions can be attributed to nitrous oxide from soils, 
32 percent to methane from enteric fermentation in 
ruminant livestock, 12 percent to biomass burning, 
11 percent to rice production and 7 percent to manure 
management. Direct agricultural emissions, as opposed 
to indirect ones discussed below, account for 60 percent 
of global nitrous oxide emissions and 50 percent of global 
methane emissions (Smith et al., 2008).
Globally, 80 percent of deforestation and forest degradation 
is believed to be related to agriculture (Kissinger et al., 
2012). A more realistic evaluation of emissions related to 
agriculture should therefore include the emissions released 
by the conversion of forests and grasslands into agricultural 
land and the degradation of peat lands. These emissions 
can be described as indirect emissions from agriculture 
and, according to Vermeulen et al. (2012), amounted to 
2.2–6.6 GtCO
2
e in 2008. If agricultural pre- and post-
production emissions are also added, the global food system 
accounts for about 19–29 percent of global greenhouse gas 
emissions (Vermeulen et al., 2012)1.
Between 1990 and 2005, direct agricultural emissions 
rose by around 0.6 GtCO
2
e per year (IPCC, 2007b), reflecting 
trends in major drivers such as population growth and 
rising affluence. These trends are expected to continue 
although their trajectories largely depend on our choices in 
natural resource management, food systems and consumer 
behaviour. Scenarios of continued population growth and 
consumption suggest that, by 2055, global agricultural 
methane and nitrous oxide emissions might increase by 
57 percent and 71 percent, respectively (Popp et al., 2010).
Although current trends predict strong growth of 
agricultural greenhouse gas emissions, there is significant 
potential to reduce them in the coming decades, particularly 
if mitigation options are mainstreamed into agricultural 
policies and incentives. At marginal costs of less than 
US $50–100 per tonne of carbon-dioxide equivalent, the 
direct emission reduction potential of agriculture lies in 
the range of 1.1–4.3 GtCO
2
e per year in 2020 (Chapter 6). 
About 89 percent of this potential could be realized through 
improved management practices such as conservation 
tillage, combined organic/inorganic fertilizer application, 
adding biochar to the soil, improved water management 
and reducing flooding and fertilizer use in rice paddies 
(Smith et al., 2008). Emissions could be further reduced by 
abating emissions in the broader food sector, for example, 
by reducing food waste and meat consumption.
Lead author: Henry Neufeldt (World Agroforestry Centre, Kenya)
Contributing authors: Tapan K. Adhya (KIIT University, India), Jeanne Y. Coulibaly (AfricaRice, Benin), Gabrielle Kissinger (Lexeme Consulting, 
Canada), Genxing Pan (Nanjing Agricultural University, China)
____________________ 
1 Emissions originate from the global food system during pre-production (fertilizer 
manufacture, energy use in animal-feed and pesticide production); during 
production (direct and indirect emissions from producing crops and livestock); and 
during post-production (primary and secondary food processing, food storage, 
packaging and transport, food refrigeration, retail of food products, catering and 
domestic food management, and the disposal of food waste).
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The most promising and cheapest mitigation options in 
agriculture are those that lead to an increase in productivity 
and income, while the demand for inputs, land or labour 
rise at a lower rate. It is, however, necessary to minimize 
environmental externalities to avoid undermining the long-
term provisioning capacity of our agro-ecosystems (Garnett 
et al., 2013; Neufeldt et al., 2013). It should also be noted 
that climate mitigation in agriculture involves more than 
reducing emissions. It can also mean increasing the uptake 
of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere by biomass or soil 
organic matter. Furthermore it can also involve avoiding or 
displacing emissions, either by substituting fossil fuels with 
biofuels, or forestalling the conversion of natural vegetation 
into agricultural lands (Smith et al., 2008). 
Bringing about change in agricultural management 
practices, however, for climate or other reasons is not easy. 
More often than not there are important market- or tenure-
related barriers that need to be overcome. Experience 
also suggests that overcoming these barriers individually 
is often unsuccessful. It is better that they are addressed 
in an integrated way, with interventions simultaneously 
supporting farmers, the governance and market conditions 
in which they operate, and the science and resources upon 
which technological change depends. Experience has also 
shown that the policies successful in overcoming barriers are 
often the ones that are attuned to local conditions. 
In the remainder of this chapter we present examples 
of concrete agricultural policies that have managed to 
overcome barriers and have been successful in mitigating 
climate change while raising income and enhancing 
food security. 
4.2 Conversion of tillage to no-tillage 
practices
Drivers and benefits of policy change
Conventional plough-based farming developed largely as a 
means for farmers to control weeds. However, it leaves soils 
vulnerable to water and wind erosion, increases agricultural 
runoff, degrades soil productivity and releases greenhouse 
gases by disturbing soils and burning fossil fuels for farm 
machinery. No-till practices – sowing seeds directly under 
the mulch layer from the previous crop – reverse this process 
by minimizing mechanical soil disturbance, providing 
permanent soil cover by organic materials and diversifying 
crop species grown in sequence and/or association 
(FAO, 2013a).
The financial benefits of no-till practices can be 
considerable, but depend on the location. Farmers save 
between 30–40 percent of time, labour and fossil fuel inputs 
using no-till practices, compared to conventional tillage 
(FAO, 2001; Lorenzatti, 2006). In Argentina it was found that 
one litre of fuel was needed to produce 50 kg of grain under 
conventional tillage, but it could produce 123 kg under no-
till practices (Lorenzatti, 2006).
Climate adaptation benefits can also be significant. While 
Kazakhstan’s 2012 drought and high temperatures halved 
wheat yields overall, wheat grown under no-till practices 
were more resilient, producing yields three times higher 
than conventionally cultivated crops (FAO, 2012).
Although no-till practices have only a small effect on 
reducing methane or nitrous-oxide emissions (Smith et al., 
2008), a number of studies show the significant potential 
of no-till cultivation to sequester carbon. The expansion of 
Brazil’s no-tillage system under its National Plan for Low 
Carbon Agriculture (ABC Plan), for example, may build up an 
additional 500 kg per hectare and year of soil organic carbon, 
offsetting a total of 16–20 MtCO
2
e by 2020, equivalent to 
1.6–2.0 MtCO
2
e per year. Kenya anticipates an increase 
in carbon uptake of 1.1 MtCO
2
e by 2030, equivalent to 
0.04 MtCO
2
e per year, from no-till farming activities 
under its Climate Change Action Plan (Stiebert et al., 
2012). In China, no-till farming may sequester a total of 
2.27 MtCO
2
e of soil carbon by 2015, equivalent to 
0.5 MtCO
2
e per year (Cheng et al., 2013a). These are all estimates 
of the potential to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions; 
estimates of what has already been achieved are given in the 
next section.
Policies that work
Governments have traditionally encouraged no-till 
practices as a measure to curtail soil erosion, and have only 
recently begun to promote it as a way to mitigate greenhouse 
gas emissions. However, farmers face difficult challenges 
during the transition to no-till practices related to high 
investment costs for machinery, increased dependence on 
such herbicides as glyphosate, changes in production inputs, 
and differences in crop and cover-crop management2. Thus, 
support is required for farmers during the transition.
In 2011 Brazil established its ABC Plan, the first national 
policy promoting no-till cultivation, which includes 
state-level activities, based upon local and sub-national 
government plans3. It sets implementation goals, anticipating 
that adoption of no-till practices increase from 31 million 
hectares to 39 million hectares under the plan. Farmers have 
access to ABC Plan credit and finance as well as training and 
extension services if management practices are compliant 
with the approach. 
The adoption of no-till practices in Brazil was brought 
about by many factors: new knowledge on no-till systems 
stemming from research by the Brazilian Agricultural 
Research Corporation; support from farmer associations 
such as the Brazilian Federation of Direct Planting and 
Irrigation; backing from agricultural machinery companies 
who recognize the potential benefits from promoting the 
technology and expanding their markets; and recognition 
by farmers that no-till practices bring increased land 
productivity and reduced production costs (Casão Junior et 
al., 2012).
Between 1982 and 1997 overall cropland erosion dropped 
by more than a third in the USA, where policy interventions to 
promote no-till practices on highly erodible land contributed 
up to 62 percent of the overall reductions (Claassen, 2012)4. 
Classifying soils as highly erodible made it easier to target 
____________________ 
2 To combat weeds, farmers may resort to an over-use of glyphosate or may rely 
on genetically modified crops, notably corn or soy. Alternatives are available, but 
support for farmers is required if those alternatives are to be introduced.
3 Brazil’s ABC Plan also includes: species diversification through rotation of crops, 
succession or combination of crops in a variety of production systems; permanent 
soil cover, either as mulch or perennial species; organic matter of sufficient quality 
and according to the soil’s biological demand; and further conservation agriculture 
practices, depending on the location.
4 From 3.1 billion tonnes of soil in 1982 to 1.9 billion tonnes in 1997.
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specific areas for conversion to no-till cultivation, enabled 
by financial support from the United States Department of 
Agriculture. To get this support, farmers on highly erodible 
lands, approximately 25 percent of all USA cropland, had 
to devise and have approved a soil conservation plan. 
As a result, in 2009, 35 percent of USA cropland, mostly 
producing soy, was under no- or reduced-tillage, although 
often not permanently, which reduces its effectiveness to 
sequester carbon.
No-till agriculture increased in Australia from 9 percent 
of cropland in 1990 to 74 percent in 2010 (Llewellyn and 
D’Emden, 2010), particularly in grain producing areas. 
Awareness of soil erosion problems, region-specific 
information and learning opportunities for farmers, and 
declines in the price of glyphosphate, all contributed to the 
adoption of no-till practices (D’Emden, et al., 2006; Llewellyn 
and D’Emden, 2010). Australia’s Landcare Programme, a 
community-based approach to land management, which is 
now made up of 6 000 farmer groups across the country, 
has played a key role in information dissemination and 
technical support (Department of Agriculture, 2013). The 
programme provides a refundable tax offset, financed by 
carbon-tax revenues, of 15 percent of the purchase price 
of an eligible no-till seeder to participating farmers. More 
recently, Australia has recognised the greenhouse gas 
reduction potential of no-till practices by including them in 
its Carbon Farming Futures programme – part of Australia’s 
Clean Energy Future Plan, and central to the cropland 
management component of Australia’s national greenhouse 
gas-reduction target.
Chinese interventions to increase the use of no-till practices 
have aimed to reduce soil erosion, treat crop residue, and 
eliminate their post-harvest burning.5 Up to now, reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions has not been a factor. As in much 
of Asia, smaller farm sizes restricted adoption of no-till 
practices. In addition, crop residues were commonly used 
for alternative purposes, such as feed for livestock (Lindwall 
and Sontag, 2010). China hopes to expand no-till practices 
to 13.3 million hectares by 2015 (Ministry of Agriculture, 
2009), especially by providing subsidies to farmers (Zhao, et 
al., 2012).
No-till practices have spread across diverse soil types 
and agricultural production systems around the world over 
the last 30 years. The MERCOSUR countries of Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay have the highest rates of no-
till cultivation, covering 70 percent of total cultivated area, 
two-thirds of which are under permanent no-till schemes, 
resulting in significantly increased soil carbon storage 
(Derpsch et al., 2010). Table 4.1 shows the cumulative 
mitigation benefits of up to 240 MtCO
2
e of avoided 
emissions in selected countries based on annual greenhouse 
gas mitigation rates in different climatic zones as provided 
in Smith et al. (2008) and best-available information on the 
coverage of no-till cultivated areas6.  
Table 4.1 Greenhouse gas mitigation through no-till cultivation, selected countries.
Country Climate zone Base year Area under no-tillage 
in 2007/8
Best estimate cumulative avoided greenhouse gas emissions 
by replacing till- with no-till cultivation
(between indicated base year and 2007/8) 
Unit (million hectares) (MtCO
2
e)
Notes (a) (b) (c) (d)
Australia (e) warm-dry 1976 17 95.2
Argentina warm-moist 1993 19.7 109.4
Bolivia warm-moist 1996 0.7 3.1
Brazil warm-moist 1992 25.5 145.7
Canada cool-moist 1985 13.5 82.3
China(f) cool-dry 2000 2 1.6
Kazakhstan cool-dry 2006 1.2 0.2
New Zealand cool-moist 1993 0.16 0.7
Uruguay warm-moist 1999 0.66 2.0
USA cool-moist 1974 26.5 241.3
Notes:
(a) Considering the lack of information on where no-till cultivation is being practiced, we assume one climate zone throughout the country, 
considering, where possible, the regional distribution of no-till agriculture.
(b) The base year is the estimated year in which the area of no-till cultivation began significantly expanding from a small baseline value in the 
country. The base year was estimated by linearly extending adoption rates from Derpsch et al. (2010), unless otherwise stated. 
(c) From Derpsch et al. (2010), unless otherwise stated.
(d) Mitigation here refers mostly to avoided carbon dioxide emissions, with a small amount of avoided nitrous oxide emissions. Mitigation 
estimates on a per hectare basis are from Smith et al. (2008). These were multiplied by the area covered by no-till cultivation to obtain a 
value for total avoided emissions in Mt per year in the country for a particular year. To obtain the cumulative emissions in column 5, the 
annual emissions were summed for each year from 2007/8 back to the base year (in column 3). To compute the area covered by no-till 
cultivation in each year, it was assumed that the area covered decreased linearly from 2007/8 back to the base year (in column 3). In 
countries with long histories of no-till agriculture this probably led to an underestimate of the mitigation that was achieved. However, if 
the use of no-till cultivation began very slowly, then it is also possible that cumulative avoided emissions were overestimated.
(e) The 2007/8 estimate is derived from Derpsch et al. (2010) whereas the base year was established from Llewellyn and D’Emden (2010).
(f) The area stated for China is derived from Liu and Qingdong (2007) and Ministry of Agriculture (2009).
____________________
5  Refers to materials left in the field after harvest, such as straw, which can act as 
mulch if retained until the next crop.
6  These best estimates have a wide uncertainty range caused by the variation in 
conditions under which measurements were made, among other factors.
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____________________
7 Broadcasting refers to a uniform distribution of fertilizer on the soil surface. It 
differs from deep placement in the sense that it requires more fertilizer and also 
increases leaching and run-off of nitrogen, especially during the rainy season.
4.3 Improved nutrient and water 
management in rice systems
Drivers and benefits of policy change 
Rice cultivation contributes more than 25 percent of 
global anthropogenic methane emissions but there are 
good options for reducing these emissions. Here we focus 
on three innovative and promising cropping practices that 
not only reduce methane emissions but also greatly improve 
the management of water and nutrients in rice cultivation 
– alternate wetting and drying (AWD), the system of rice 
intensification, and urea deep placement (UDP).
Alternate wetting and drying is a water management 
practice for irrigated rice fields through which farmers can 
achieve 5–30 percent water savings, lower labour costs, no 
significant yield penalty and profit increases of up to 8 percent 
(IRRI, 2013). Where it has been used on farms in Bangladesh, 
yields have risen by more than 10 percent, raising income 
by US $67–97 per hectare (IRRI, 2013). In Rwanda and 
Senegal, rice yield increased from 2–3 tonnes per hectare 
to 6–8 tonnes per hectare due to the similar system of rice 
intensification (Baldé, 2013; Cissé, 2013).
Another option for reducing emissions, urea deep 
placement, consists of inserting urea granules into the 
rice root zone after transplanting. It is reported to reduce 
fertilizer use by 35 percent while increasing crop yields by 
about 20 percent (IFDC, 2012). In Nigeria, for example, 
farmers were able to harvest 2.69 tonnes more rice per 
hectare using this technology than when broadcasting urea 
(IFDC, 2012)7.
Although the emission reduction potentials of these 
nutrient and water conserving techniques are in principle 
very high, actual reduction figures are sparse. Adoption of 
alternate wetting and drying has been shown to reduce the 
emissions of methane by 40 percent per year on China’s rice 
paddies, compared to continuously flooded rice production 
(Li et al., 2005). With urea deep placement, large fertilizer 
users such as China and India could achieve nitrogen 
fertilizer savings of up to 6.43 Mt and 2.89 Mt per year, 
respectively (Sutton et al., 2013). At the same time, nitrous 
oxide emissions would be reduced because of lower leaching 
and denitrification. In China, for instance, a mitigation 
potential of 0.08 to 0.36 tCO
2
e per tonne of grain yield is 
possible by reducing nitrogen chemical fertilizer rates along 
with intermittent flooding in paddy rice cropping systems 
(Cheng et al., 2013b).
Policies that work
There are many examples of success in adopting alternate 
wetting and drying, the system of rice intensification and 
urea deep placement across the world. Governments have 
helped in many cases by providing the necessary incentives 
and support.
In Bangladesh, government support and policies, as well as 
targeted public-private partnerships and research, have led 
to high adoption rates of both alternate wetting and drying 
and urea deep placement. As an example of government 
support, alternate wetting and drying was introduced into 
the draft of the first National Irrigation Policy of Bangladesh. 
A key incentive turned out to be the government’s support 
for appropriate irrigation pipes or the adaptation of 
existing pipes (Kürschner et al., 2010). The International 
Rice Research Institute and the Bangladesh Rice Research 
Institute played key roles in mainstreaming the technique 
by raising awareness of its benefits and providing technical 
guidance. The use of TV, radio and newspapers also played an 
important role in the awareness raising process (Kürschner 
et al., 2010) – to date more than 100 000 farmers have 
adopted alternate wetting and drying practices (IRRI, 2012).
As a promoter of the fertilizer deep placement technology, 
the International Fertilizer Development Center took a 
leadership role in introducing urea deep placement to 
Bangladesh in the mid-1980s. Among other actions, the 
Centre organized demonstrations of urea deep placement 
techniques. By 2012 more than 2.5 million Bangladeshi 
farmers were using the technology, and it was expected to 
be adopted by an additional 1 million farmers across the 
country (IFDC, 2013). 
Alternate wetting and drying and the system of rice 
intensification (a technique similar to alternate wetting 
and drying) have also been introduced very successfully to 
other parts of Asia. According to Uphoff (2012) more than 
1 million Vietnamese farmers had adopted the system of 
rice intensification by 2011; in the Philippines, more than 
100 000 farmers had begun using alternate wetting and 
drying by 2012, and it is expected that 600 000 farmers will 
have adopted this technology by 2015 (Rejesus et al., 2013; 
IRRI, 2013).
In Africa, the government of Madagascar supported the 
diffusion of the system of rice intensification by providing 
access to microcredit services, particularly in areas with 
weak coverage by microfinance institutions. The government 
facilitated the acquisition of farm equipment by liaising 
with microcredit institutions and by offering incentives 
to the private sector in production areas (Ministry of 
Agriculture, 2008). These credits also promoted knowledge 
and information sharing and thereby helped scale up 
the technology. 
As women play a prominent role in rice production 
in Madagascar, the government also relied extensively 
on women’s networks to promote the system of rice 
intensification. Priority was given to providing women 
with training in how the system is practiced. Some rural 
communities relaxed current restrictions on women’s access 
to land and agricultural equipment, suggesting that women, 
through government support, have significantly contributed 
to the increase in usage of the system8. The technique is also 
being used on a small scale, but with increasing interest, in 
several other African countries, including Benin, Cameroon 
and Senegal (Agridape, 2013)9.
As a general lesson, emissions of greenhouse gases 
from rice cultivation can be substantially reduced through 
efficient management of fertilizer and water. Here we have 
____________________ 
8  In many African locations women do not have land ownership rights.
9 The governments of Rwanda and Senegal have helped introduce the system 
of rice intensification by providing credits to rice cooperatives and through 
knowledge and information sharing (Cissé, 2013).
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talked about three innovative and promising approaches – 
alternate wetting and drying, urea deep placement and the 
system of rice intensification. Several steps could be taken 
to quickly scale up of these useful practices. First, they 
could be included in national agricultural policies. Second, 
direct financial support could be provided to farmers. Third, 
it would be very helpful to coordinate the support coming 
from the private sector and from organizations involved in 
research and agricultural extension training. Finally, direct 
support to women involved in rice cultivation would be very 
effective in scaling up these practices.
4.4 Agroforestry
Drivers and benefits of policy change
Agroforestry refers to a land management approach 
involving the simultaneous cultivation of farm crops and 
trees. In addition to sequestering carbon in the tree biomass, 
agroforestry generally improves microclimate and water 
balance, reduces erosion and raises soil fertility, among 
other ecosystem services. It leads, therefore, to higher 
crop and livestock productivity and, hence, income 
(Garrity et al., 2006; Schoeneberger et al., 2012). For 
instance, Haglund et al. (2011) reported 18–24 percent 
higher household incomes following the introduction in Niger 
of a variant of agroforestry called ‘farmer managed natural 
regeneration’. Garrity et al. (2010) summarized experiences 
with maize grown in association with a tree called Faidherbia 
albida in several African countries, reporting yield increases of 
6–200 percent, depending on the age of the trees (Figure 4.1). 
In temperate mechanized agroforestry systems, Dupraz and 
Talbot (2012) have shown land equivalent ratios reaching 
1.2–1.6, suggesting that planting trees and crops together is 
more efficient than when the two are planted separately10.
Through diversification of income from fuel, fodder, fruit, 
timber, and the reduction of labour for firewood collection 
and the generally strong resilience of trees to climate 
variability, agroforestry has also shown to provide greater 
food security under climate shocks than conventional 
farming (Thorlakson and Neufeldt, 2012).
The mitigation potential of agroforestry systems is 
theoretically very high, but strongly dependent on the agro-
ecosystem, the species being planted, and on the specific 
type of agroforestry practice. One estimate is that it could 
potentially mitigate 2.2 GtCO
2
e per year (Verchot et al., 
2007). This large figure stems from the fact that agroforestry 
has the possibility of being applied to 630 million hectares 
worldwide (Verchot et al., 2007).
The amount of carbon sequestered in agroforestry 
systems typically ranges from 1.06 tCO
2
 per hectare per 
year to 55.77 tCO
2 
per hectare per year for biomass carbon 
(Nair et al., 2009) and from 0.17 tCO
2
e per hectare per year 
to 1.89 tCO
2
e per hectare per year for soil carbon (Smith et 
al., 2008). Recently Aertsens et al. (2013) estimated that 
agroforestry could provide 90 percent of the potential of 
agriculture in Europe to take up additional carbon dioxide 
from the atmosphere11. 
Policies that work
Despite agroforestry’s high potential for increasing 
welfare and providing environmental services, there may 
be significant opportunity costs associated with establishing 
such systems and long time-lags before they generate 
returns (FAO, 2013b). Particularly in smallholder farming, 
the barriers include lack of access to farm inputs, capital, 
markets and training; uncertain land tenure situations; weak 
institutions and governance structures; and poor seed and 
seedling provisioning systems (Thorlakson and Neufeldt, 
2012). Policies are needed to overcome these barriers.
____________________ 
11  The total technical potential in the EU-27 is estimated to be 1 566 MtCO
2
e per 
year, corresponding to 37 percent of all carbon dioxide equivalent emissions in 
the EU in 2007. The introduction of agroforestry is the measure with the highest 
potential – 90 percent of the total potential of the measures studied (Aertsens et 
al., 2013).
Figure 4.1 Mature Faidherbia albida between maize in Tanzania. One of the characteristics of the species is its reverse phenology: 
the tree sheds its leaves in the rainy season and goes dormant, reducing competition for light and water while providing valuable 
nitrogen-rich litter that is also good fodder. (Copyright: ICRAF).
____________________
10  A land equivalent ratio of 1 suggests that planting crops and trees together 
requires just as much land as planting them separately. A ratio greater than 1 
indicates that it requires less land to produce the same amount of crops and trees.
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Niger is one example of a country where these barriers have 
been overcome. Here, a combination of declining traditional 
governance structures in the 1920s and 1930s and severe 
droughts and famines in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in the 
overuse of common lands, which led in turn to a shrinking 
of natural tree cover by about 90 percent (Sendzemir et al., 
2011). Reforestation began in earnest in the 1980s when 
the practice of ‘farmer managed natural regeneration’, 
introduced by several non-governmental organizations, was 
adopted on a large scale because of a change in government 
policies regarding the use and felling of parkland tree species 
(Reij et al., 2009). While farmers had previously ripped out 
germinating trees because they had no claim to ownership 
over the trees’ products and services, they now let them 
grow selectively. Within two decades this combination of 
non-governmental and governmental support led to a re-
greening of about 5 million hectares of nearly barren bush 
savanna (Reij et al., 2009).
Another example is Kenya, where the government has 
adopted policies to promote farm forestry12. Key actions 
include the relaxation of restrictions on harvesting and 
marketing of tree products, tax incentives for growing trees 
on farms, and the creation of contract farming schemes 
to enhance trading of tree products between landholders 
and companies13. Wangari Mathai’s Green Belt Movement 
has also been instrumental in raising awareness about the 
importance of trees and for mobilizing thousands of women 
to plant millions of trees. In western and central Kenya 
this mix of regulation and incentives has resulted in a 
215 000 hectares expansion of agroforestry over the last
30 years (Norton-Griffiths, 2013). Other national policies 
have promoted tree planting on Kenyan farms (Ajayi and 
Place, 2012) by supporting the training of extension service 
staff, establishing tree nurseries countrywide and prohibiting 
the harvesting of trees from public forests14.
In northern India, beginning in the late 1970s, poplar 
trees have been rapidly added to irrigated wheat and 
barley farms and now cover about 280 000 hectares – or 
10 percent of irrigated agricultural lands in this region. 
Poplars provide timber and other benefits to farmers and 
barely compete with crops for light and water. Meanwhile, 
the Forest Conservation Amendment Act of 1988 prohibited 
cutting timber from state forests, and this increased the 
price of wood and created an economic incentive to plant 
trees on farms (Ajayi and Place, 2012). Agroforestry was 
further encouraged through credits for tree planting from 
the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
and through support provided by the timber industry in the 
form of higher quality planting material, such as seeds, fruit 
or aggregate fruit; training in agroforestry; and guaranteed 
timber prices.
In Europe and North America, agroforestry is mainly 
promoted for the ecosystem services it provides (Dupraz 
and Liagre, 2008; Current et al., 2009; Jacobson, 2012; 
Schoeneberger et al., 2012). Yet, despite its long-term 
economic benefits, agroforestry has not achieved its potential 
in Europe because of high investment costs and the perceived 
complexity of introducing annual and perennial plantings 
into high-input, mechanized agriculture (Papanastasis 
and Mantzanas, 2012). To encourage the expansion of 
agroforestry, the European Agroforestry Federation has 
recently called for reforms of the European Common 
Agricultural Policy, including greater financial support to 
farmers and more flexible eligibility rules (EURAF, 2013).
4.5 Lessons learned
To mitigate greenhouse gas emissions effectively while 
achieving development goals in the agriculture sector, the 
following factors should be considered:
-	 Agricultural mitigation options require a coordinated 
mix of policy support, private and public sector 
investment, strengthened research, and capacity 
building of key stakeholders. Specific actions are 
needed to demonstrate the benefits of new technologies 
to farmers, to coordinate needed investments and to 
disseminate information about benefits and how to 
overcome barriers. These actions can be supported by 
public-private partnerships and by research centres, 
governments, agricultural extension services, the 
private sector and non-governmental organizations.
-	 Multiple benefits require multiple goals. At the early 
policy-development stage it makes sense to articulate a 
number of environmental, social and other goals rather 
than one objective alone. This makes it easier to identify 
synergies between different goals rather than having to 
resolve trade-offs between them. Multiple goals can 
lead to multiple benefits of climate change mitigation, 
improved agricultural productivity and enhanced 
food security.
-	 Financial incentives are needed. A major barrier to 
the adoption of emission reduction measures has 
been the lack of financial incentives for farmers to 
adopt new technologies and practices. Financial 
incentives, including tax offsets, subsidies, and credits, 
are needed to help farmers in both developing and 
developed countries defray high up-front investment 
costs. Incentives are also needed because no-till and 
agroforestry practices can have a several year time-lag 
before their climate and other benefits are realized. 
Subsidies and microcredit may be particularly important 
for poor rice farmers who usually lack access to capital 
and credit.
-	 In order to be successful in mitigating emissions, 
new technologies must be context-specific to the 
region or country where they are introduced. For 
example, for no-till practices to be successful they must 
take into account local farm size, crop and soil types, 
carbon/nitrogen ratio over the crop rotation. Context 
specific research at landscape scale, as well as learning 
from past mistakes, is important for making each 
mitigation option work. In addition, land tenure issues 
have to be resolved before the needed investments 
and changes in new agricultural practices can be made.
____________________
12  Through the Economic Recovery Strategy (Ministry of Planning and National 
Development, 2003), the Forest Act (Ministry of Water and Irrigation, 2005) and 
the Draft Forest Policy (Ministry of Enviroment and Natural Resources, 2007).
13  Contract farming is agricultural production carried out according to an 
agreement between a buyer and farmers, which establishes conditions for the 
production and marketing of a farm product or products (FAO, Rome, 2008).
14  The Forest Policy (Goverment of Kenya, 1968) and the Rural Afforestation and 
Extension Services Division, set up in 1971.
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Bridging the gap II: International 
cooperative initiatives
Chapter 5
5.1 Introduction
There are many initiatives underway outside of the Climate 
Convention aimed at reducing emissions of greenhouse gases 
by promoting actions that are less greenhouse gas intensive. 
We refer to these initiatives collectively as international 
cooperative initiatives1. These initiatives complement 
and support pledges and other actions under UNFCCC 
in a number of different ways: some focus on assisting 
countries to meet a variety of goals and have climate change 
mitigation as an ancillary benefit, while for others the central 
objective is reducing emissions of greenhouse gases for 
climate purposes.
This chapter pays particular attention to those initiatives 
that can support meeting and exceeding current pledges 
and help narrow the emissions gap. Specifically, this would 
include international cooperative initiatives that provide 
emission reductions that are likely to be additional to 
those stemming from national emission reduction pledges 
and actions.
The chapter first provides an overview of the different 
initiatives, including a categorization by type. Appendix 5.A 
complements this information by giving a sample of the many 
international cooperative initiatives currently active. It then 
identifies where large potential exists to close the gap and 
finishes with a set of possible criteria for designing initiatives 
that could be most effective in closing the emissions gap.
5.2 Current international cooperative 
initiatives
A categorization of existing initiatives reveals that the 
topics covered, actors involved and participation levels 
vary greatly across them. The reader is referred 
to Appendix 5.A for an overview of initiatives (note that the 
overview is illustrative and not comprehensive).
Initiatives underway can be put into three categories:
1. Global dialogues. These initiatives provide a forum for 
national governments to exchange information and 
understand national priorities. Some are primarily at 
the head-of-government level, such as the G8 and the 
G20; others at the ministerial level, such as the Major 
Economies Forum. Some include industry, academia, 
and/or civil society. These groups may issue statements 
of intent or voluntary commitments and otherwise 
contribute to consensus building.
2. Formal multilateral processes. A number of 
international organizations and formal international 
negotiation processes are addressing issues that 
are relevant to the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions. These include international treaties such 
as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer or sector specific organizations 
such as the International Civil Aviation Organization 
or the International Maritime Organization. These 
international cooperative initiatives can produce 
binding international agreements to reduce emissions.
3. Implementation initiatives. There are many initiatives 
that focus on enabling countries to meet their 
pledges through sharing good practices and technical 
knowledge. Some concentrate on technical dialogues, 
including for instance the Mitigation and MRV 
Partnership, or the Clean Energy Ministerial. The more 
technical the discussion, the more non-governmental 
actors are often involved. Other initiatives go beyond 
dialogue to support sector-specific initiatives through 
the collective implementation and, in many cases, 
funding of programmes or projects. This may include 
the facilitation of clean energy projects, for example, 
through the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
Partnership, the development of sector-specific action 
plans such as those developed under the Climate and 
Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-Lived Climate 
Pollutants, or the implementation of programmes 
Lead authors : Niklas Höhne (Ecofys, Germany), Jennifer Morgan (World Resources Institute, USA)
Contributing authors: Lutz Weischer (World Resources Institute, Germany), Durwood Zaelke (Institute for Governance and Sustainable 
Development, USA), Yemi Katerere (Independent Consultant, Zimbabwe)
____________________
1 In this chapter we assume that international cooperative initiatives are initiatives 
with participants from at least three countries. These could be governmental 
entities from the national, sub-national or local level and/or non-state actors, 
including businesses and NGOs.
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to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation such as the REDD+ Partnership. Some 
of these sector-specific implementation groups are 
independent of national governments.
To assess the extent to which international cooperative 
initiatives can help bridge the emissions gap, it is necessary to 
differentiate between the type of contribution each initiative 
makes – direct or indirect. Global dialogues and many of the 
implementation initiatives focus on building consensus and 
sharing best practices, making an important – but indirect 
– contribution to narrowing the gap. Other initiatives lead 
to direct greenhouse gas reductions. To the extent that they 
cover sectors and countries currently outside of the pledges, 
or support countries to reduce emissions beyond these 
pledges, they make a direct contribution to narrowing the 
gap. The remainder of this chapter focuses on initiatives that 
may lead to direct reductions, particularly in those areas that 
represent high mitigation potential.
5.3 Promising areas for international 
cooperative initiatives to close the gap
Three studies (Blok et al., 2012; IEA, 2013; UNFCCC, 2013) 
have identified promising mitigation measures and areas to 
narrow the gap (Table 5.1). Criteria used to identify these 
promising areas across the studies include:
-	 a minimum level of already-started activity;
-	 an organization that can take the lead in scaling up 
activities;
-	 a positive or neutral impact on the economy;
-	 a minimum level of mitigation potential, of size or 
critical mass of participants.
The above three studies highlighted four priority mitigation 
measures in particular: 
-	 energy efficiency; 
-	 fossil fuel subsidy reform; 
-	 methane and other short-lived climate pollutants; and 
-	 renewable energy.
Mitigation measures and areas Reduction Potential Initiatives
Wedging the 
gap (Blok et 
al., 2012)
GtCO
2
e per 
year in 2020
UNFCCC 
technical paper 
(UNFCCC, 2013)          
GtCO
2
e per             
year in 2020
IEA energy/
climate map 
(IEA, 2013)
GtCO
2
e per     
year in 2020
Approximate 
number
Energy efficiency Buildings’ heating and cooling 0.6 2 0.5 25
Ban of incandescent lamps 0.5 0.5
Electric appliances 0.6
Industrial motor systems 0.4
Car- and truck-emission reduction 0.7 0.2
Renewable energy Boost solar photovoltaic energy 1.4 1–2.5 17
Boost wind energy 1.2
Access energy through low- emission options 0.4
Limiting inefficient coal use in electricity generation 0.7 None
Methane and other 
short-lived climate 
pollutants
Reducing methane emissions from fossil-fuel 
production
* 1.1 0.6 7
Other methane and other short-lived climate 
pollutants
Efficient cook stoves *
Fluorinated greenhouse gases 0.3 0.5 3
Fossil-fuel subsidy reform 0.9 1.5–2 0.4 1
International transport 0.2 0.3–0.5 4
Agriculture 0.8 1.3–4.2 1
Reduce deforestation 1.8 1.1–4.3 15
Waste 0.8 1
Reduce emissions 
from companies
Top-1 000 company emission reduction 0.7 4
Supply chain emission reduction 0.2 1
Green financial institutions 0.4 1
Voluntary offset companies 2.0 None
Voluntary offsets by consumers 1.6 None
Major cities initiative 0.7 3
Sub-national governments 0.6 2
Total 9.7** Not added because 
of ranges
3.3 ***
*not estimated, **accounting for overlaps, *** total does not add up because of roundings
Notes: The reduction potential is not strictly comparable. The UNFCCC technical paper (UNFCCC, 2013) presents mitigation potentials for 
entire sectors. Blok et al. (2012) estimate the potential of an initiative assuming that it can realize only a fraction of the theoretical potential. 
IEA (2013) reports model estimates. The numbers of initiatives are approximations based on the annex, which includes only a selection of 
initiatives.
Table 5.1 Promising areas for international cooperative initiatives and three estimates of associated reduction potential
The Emissions Gap Report 2013 – Bridging the gap II: International cooperative initiatives 31
Fluorinated greenhouse gases and international transport 
are also frequently listed as priority areas. In addition, the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) highlights the large short-
term potential of limiting inefficient coal use in electricity 
generation, an area that is currently not covered by any 
international cooperative initiatives. On the other hand, 
other areas are covered by more than one initiative, for 
example, reducing emissions from deforestation.
To date there have been very few quantitative assessments 
of the impact of cooperative initiatives. Some studies analyze 
the past and possible future impact of individual initiatives, 
notably studies on the Sustainable Energy for All Initiative 
(Rogelj et al. 2013), the WWF Climate Savers Programme 
(Ecofys, 2012), the Covenant of Mayors (Cerutti et al., 
2013), and the phase out of hydrofluorocarbons (Hare et al., 
2013; Molina et al., 2009; UNEP, 2011; Velders et al., 2009; 
Velders et al., 2012; Xu et al., 2013; Zaelke et al., 2012). 
No study was found on the aggregate past impacts of 
cooperative initiatives.
Only a few initiatives are clearly outside the scope of 
national pledges, namely those on international aviation 
and shipping, and those on short-lived climate pollutants, or 
initiatives on non-carbon dioxide gases for those countries 
whose pledges only apply to carbon dioxide emissions. All 
other initiatives potentially overlap with national pledges 
and, because of this, it is not yet possible to assess the 
volume of reductions expected from these initiatives alone.
The overview of initiatives in Appendix 5.A illustrates 
the diversity found in both approach and membership, 
as well as the overlap found in some priority mitigation
measures. An element of coordination or integration 
among overlapping initiatives would likely strengthen their 
collective effectiveness.
Finally, participation in the initiatives, especially for 
developing countries, is constrained by various factors. 
One is the limited amount of time and capacity available 
for participation. Another is limited expertise in the subject 
areas of the initiatives. These factors raise concerns about 
the credibility and legitimacy of some initiatives. This would 
argue for fewer, but more effective and ambitious initiatives. 
Some have proposed that a coalition of initiatives could be 
helpful (Blok et al., 2012).
5.4 How to make international cooperative 
initiatives effective in closing the gap?
Few studies have been conducted on the effectiveness of 
initiatives (Bausch and Mehling, 2011; Weischer et al., 2012; 
Young, 2011). Nevertheless, based on the small amount of 
experience gained up to now, we speculate that five aspects 
are particularly important: focus and goals; participation; 
funding and institutions; incentives and benefits; and 
transparency and accountability.
Focus and goals
It has been argued that some international cooperative 
initiatives might be “specialized venues [that] could each 
address a small piece of the puzzle that the UNFCCC could 
not tackle as a whole” (Moncel and van Asselt, 2012). As 
an example, the Consumer Goods Forum, a global industry 
network of over 400 retailers, agreed to begin phasing out 
hydrofluorocarbon refrigerants by 2015, and work to achieve 
zero net deforestation by 2020. Following this model, 
international cooperative initiatives could be effective by 
having a sharp focus on a limited number of ambitious goals.
Participation
Some authors argue that limiting the number of 
participants is an important factor for effectiveness. Smaller 
groups are able to act faster (Biermann et al., 2009) and can 
be expected to be ‘narrow-but-deep’, reaching substantial 
policy goals that would not have been reached in a ‘broad-
but-shallow’ regime that has more participants but less 
ambition due to the compulsions of placating all signatories 
(Aldy et al., 2003). On the other hand, the contribution to 
closing the gap will be larger if all major current and future 
emitters participate, which might argue for a slightly larger 
group (Bausch and Mehling, 2011).
In the field of renewable energy, we find all models. 
The recently launched German initiative for a renewables 
club brings together a small group of ministers from 
10 countries considered to be leaders. Meanwhile, the 
Clean Energy Ministerial encompasses a larger group of 
23 countries accounting for 80 percent of global greenhouse 
gas emissions, and the International Renewable Energy 
Agency has almost universal participation, with 114 
member states, plus 46 in accession. No assessment has 
been made on the effectiveness of these different models, 
but it is likely that the right group size depends on an 
initiative’s mandate.
Participation of stakeholders, beyond the government 
representatives that traditionally conduct climate 
negotiations, is another factor that might enhance 
effectiveness. International cooperative initiatives might 
help bring in constituencies that have so far not been 
active in climate change issues, but could make essential 
contributions to solving the problem (Moncel and van 
Asselt, 2012). This can include government agencies that 
deal with related issues such as energy or security, as 
well as business and civil society. Two examples of multi-
stakeholder partnerships bringing together governments, 
industry representatives, non-governmental organizations 
and researchers are the Renewable Energy Partnership 
for the 21st century (REN21) and the Climate and Clean Air 
Coalition to reduce Short-lived Climate Pollutants.
Another important aspect of participation is whether high-
level participation, for example from ministers or heads of 
government, might lead to a stronger political buy-in and 
thus make an international cooperative initiative more 
effective in closing the gap. To facilitate implementation of 
their programmes, it might be useful for such initiatives to 
include not only high-level dialogues, but also mechanisms 
for working-level cooperation. For example, the Clean Energy 
Ministerial and the Climate and Clean Air Coalition both 
incorporate meetings of ministers with meetings of working 
groups consisting of experts who work on implementation.
Funding and institutions
The design of international cooperative initiatives has to 
strike a difficult balance between providing the necessary 
institutional framework for meaningful cooperation yet 
avoiding too bureaucratic an operation. An appropriate 
set-up might include a secretariat, clear procedures and 
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sufficient resources (Bausch and Mehling, 2011). Conversely, 
avoiding bureaucracy means fewer formalities, allowing 
for more flexibility and pragmatic action. For example, 
the G8 and G20 presidencies rotate from year to year and 
have no permanent secretariat, which makes systematic 
implementation and follow-up difficult, whereas the 
International Energy Agency’s Implementing Agreements 
have a secretariat, a dedicated budget and the capacity to 
implement their own projects.
Incentives and benefits
If international cooperative initiatives are to catalyse 
significant additional emission reductions, they need to 
offer compelling reasons for potential participants to join. 
These incentives would predominantly be economic benefits 
that need to be significant, equitably distributed among 
participants and, at least to a certain extent, exclusive 
to the participants (Weischer et al., 2012). One example 
of benefits is the technical and policy support provided 
by the Collaborative Labelling and Appliance Standards 
Program to governments working on energy efficiency 
standards and labels. Other examples are the two separate, 
complementary funding mechanisms provided by the Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility.
Transparency and accountability
In order to determine whether an international cooperative 
initiative is making a contribution to closing the emissions 
gap, its activities and their emissions impact need to be 
transparent. Enhancing transparency and accountability 
might also make initiatives more effective, as it represents 
an incentive to follow through on commitments and provide 
participants with confidence that others are acting as 
well (Bausch and Mehling, 2011). This might, for instance, 
include regular reporting or peer-review procedures. A 
good example is the Covenant of Mayors initiative, which 
developed detailed monitoring requirements for its actions, 
regular reporting by participants, and the independent 
verification of results.
5.5 Links with the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change
At present, there are no formal links between UNFCCC 
and the various international cooperative initiatives. 
Nevertheless, within the Convention’s Ad Hoc Working 
Group on the Durban Platform there is an on-going 
discussion about what role initiatives could play in helping 
to close the 2020 emissions gap. Whether and how to 
account within the convention for the emission reductions 
achieved by international cooperative initiatives is a key part 
of the discussion. Parties could, in principle, do this through 
existing reporting practices and rules, or through a purpose-
made methodology to account specifically for reductions 
attributable to international cooperative initiatives. 
Irrespective of the form it takes, such a reporting mechanism 
could provide an informal platform for recognizing efforts 
and, in this way, encourage performance.
5.6 Conclusions
International cooperative initiatives have the potential 
not only to support existing pledges, but to go beyond them 
to narrow the gap. To achieve this, however, they need to 
focus on the large opportunity areas and be designed and 
implemented in an effective way.
A large number of international cooperative initiatives 
currently exists, and they are very diverse in scope and 
approach. Some make an indirect contribution to closing the 
emission gap by promoting dialogue and sharing experience 
and best practice. Others have the potential to make direct 
contributions, as their mandate focuses on catalysing 
additional mitigation – by involving additional actors or 
covering additional sectors or by providing incentives for 
action beyond current pledges.
A review of the limited literature available suggests four 
broad priority areas:
1. Energy efficiency with significant potential, up to 2 
GtCO
2
e by 2020. It is already covered by a substantial 
number of initiatives. Focus and coherency is needed.
2. Fossil-fuel subsidy reform with varying estimates of 
the reduction potential: 0.4–2 GtCO
2
e by 2020. The 
number of initiatives and clear commitments in this 
area is limited.
3. Methane and other short-lived climate pollutants as 
a mix of several sources. Reducing methane emissions 
from fossil-fuel production has received particular 
attention in the literature. This area is covered by 
several specific initiatives and one that is overarching.
4. Renewable energy with particularly large potential: 
1–3 GtCO
2
e by 2020. Several initiatives have been 
started in this area. Focus and coherency is needed.
While further research is needed to arrive at more 
comparable figures on emission reduction potential, 
additional sectors in which the potential may be high include 
fluorinated greenhouse gases, international transport, 
limiting inefficient coal use in electricity generation, 
agriculture and forestry. It would be useful to have 
guidelines for clear and quantifiable commitments, and 
transparent monitoring and reporting to allow for a more 
precise quantification of the contribution of international 
cooperative initiatives to closing the gap.
Any instigator of a new initiative should assess the 
landscape before beginning something new. In issue areas 
with a high number of existing initiatives, a consolidation of 
efforts could be considered.
International cooperative initiatives need to be effective 
in delivering actual emission reductions. The following 
provisions can enhance the effectiveness of international 
cooperative initiatives:
-	 a clearly defined vision and mandate;
-	 the right mix of participants appropriate for that 
mandate, going beyond traditional climate negotiators;
-	 stronger participation from developing country actors;
-	 sufficient funding and an institutional structure that 
supports implementation and follow-up, but maintains 
flexibility;
-	 incentives for participants;
-	 transparency and accountability mechanisms.
These are preliminary findings. Additional research is 
clearly needed to systematically identify empirical lessons 
from the existing initiatives and gain a clearer understanding 
on what makes initiatives effective.
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Bridging the gap III: Overview of 
options
Chapter 6
6.1 Introduction
The analysis in Chapters 2 and 3 of this report concluded 
that the emissions gap in 2020 is likely to be 8–12 GtCO
2
e 
and showed an increase in projected business-as-usual 
emissions in 2020 compared to the 2012 report. Starting 
from the estimated total emission reduction potential, 
and based on the findings of the previous chapters, this 
chapter provides an overview of options to reduce the 
emissions gap. 
The chapter starts by asking whether the gap can be 
bridged. To answer this question, the best available 
estimates of the total emission reduction potential and 
possible changes in these estimates are discussed. Following 
this, a summary of options to narrow, and potentially bridge, 
the emissions gap in 2020 is presented.
6.2 Emission reduction potentials in 2020 and 
2030: can the gap be bridged?
The options to narrow the emissions gap discussed in 
the previous chapters of this report – emission reduction 
pledges, Chapter 2; national climate and development 
policies, Chapters 2 and 4; and international cooperative 
initiatives, Chapter 5 – all have connections with one another 
and all will help bridge the emissions gap in 2020.
UNEP’s Bridging the Emissions Gap Report (2011a) 
estimated the total emission reduction potential in 2020 to 
be in the range of 17 ± 3 GtCO
2
e 1,2. Table 6.1 provides an 
overview of emission reduction potentials by sector from 
the earlier report together with estimates for 2030 from the 
IPCC (2007).
The mid-range of 17 GtCO
2
e is slightly greater than the 
estimated difference between business-as-usual emissions 
in 2020 and the 2020 emissions level consistent with a 
likely chance of staying within the 2° C target of 15 GtCO
2
e. 
This indicates that there is still a chance to close the gap by 
Table 6.1 Estimates of sectoral greenhouse gas emission 
reduction potentials, 2020 and 2030
Lead authors : Niklas Höhne (Ecofys, Germany), Anne Olhoff (UNEP Risø Centre, Denmark)
Contributing authors: Kornelis Blok (Ecofys, Germany), Taryn Fransen (World Resources Institute, USA)
____________________
1 Adopting a sectoral bottom-up approach, with marginal costs in the range of 
50–100 US $/tCO
2
e.
2 Assuming that the uncertainties are independent between sectors, which may 
hold under many cases, an error propagation rule to calculate the range of the 
sum of the sectors is applied – that is, the square root of the sum of squares of the 
range for each sector. This gives a reduced range of ± 3 GtCO
2
e compared to the 
full range of ± 7 GtCO
2
e.
Sector Emission reduction 
potential in 2020 
(GtCO
2
e per year)
Emission reduction 
potential in 2030 
(GtCO
2
e per year)
Power sector 2.2–3.9 2.4–4.7
Manufacturing 
industry
1.5–4.6 2.5–5.5
Transportation 1.7–2.5 1.6–2.5
Buildings 1.4–2.9 5.4–6.7
Forestry 1.3–4.2 1.3–4.2
Agriculture 1.1–4.3 2.3–6.4
Waste Around 0.8 0.4–1.0
Total (central 
estimate)
17 ± 3 23 ± 3
Total (full range) 10–23 16–31
Source: Emission reduction potential in 2020 is taken from UNEP, 
(2011a; 2012). The 2030 potential is taken from IPCC (2007).
2020, but it also means that even relatively small changes in 
the total emission reduction potential could have important 
implications on the ability of society to bridge the gap. Total 
emission reduction potentials change over time, reflecting 
among other things technological development and the 
speed and comprehensiveness with which policies and 
options are adopted and implemented.
UNEP’s Emissions Gap Report 2012 emphasized that, 
although the emission reduction potential in 2020 remains 
high, time is running out with respect to realizing this 
potential (Chapter 3). First, there can be a considerable 
time lag between the adoption of emission reducing policies 
and options, their implementation and the reaping of the 
associated emission reductions. Second, many investments 
in, for example, transportation systems, energy production, 
buildings and factories are long-lived. Failure to invest 
today in best available technologies and options not only 
represents a lost opportunity to reduce emissions, it also 
curtails our ability to reduce them in the near future as high 
energy use and emission patterns are locked-in for several 
decades. Postponing action implies that part of the potential 
in 2020 may be lost and that steeper and more costly 
action will be required to achieve the remaining potential 
(Chapter 3).
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Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent national pledges 
and international cooperative initiatives cover the sectoral 
emission reduction potentials. As countries rarely specify a 
split of their pledge by sector, it is difficult to make a complete 
assessment of the degree of overlap. Ideally, such overlaps 
should be taken into account when assessing options for 
narrowing the emissions gap through additional action.
Comprehensive and regular updates of emission reduction 
potentials are a prerequisite for in-depth assessments of 
the feasibility of bridging the emissions gap. Unfortunately, 
the number of new studies published since the 2012 
update (UNEP, 2012) is limited and prevents a thorough re-
evaluation of the emission reduction potentials in Table 6.1. 
The new studies do, nonetheless, provide an assessment 
of the possible take-up of emission reduction options for 
particular scenarios and specific assumptions regarding 
policy regimes and carbon prices. They give an indication of 
current trends for the sectoral emission reduction potentials 
reported in Table 6.1. Recent developments in the power 
and transportation sectors point towards possible increases 
in the emission reduction potentials for 2020 – modest – 
and 2030 – potentially substantial. More specifically, for the 
power sector, rapid growth of renewable energy (Breyer, 
2011; REN21, 2013) might be able to more than compensate 
for the limited development reported for nuclear energy and 
carbon capture and storage reported by the International 
Energy Agency (IEA, 2013). Some authors highlight that, if 
the current rate of growth of wind and solar photovoltaic 
power continues after 2020, decarbonization rates for 
electricity could be higher than expected in even the most 
ambitious scenarios, increasing the 2030 emission reduction 
potential by several GtCO
2
e (Blok and Van Breevoort, 2011). 
In the transportation sector, a rapid decline of carbon-
dioxide emissions per vehicle kilometre for passenger cars 
is observed (IEA, 2013). Less is known about other parts 
of the transportation sector. A study for 2030 shows that 
implementation of appropriate policies for vehicle efficiency, 
modal shift and activity reduction could lead to a reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions of 5.8 GtCO
2
e in 2030, compared 
to a business-as-usual scenario (Façanha et al., 2012). This 
is more than double the potential in 2030 given in Table 
6.1, although developments in other parts of the transport 
sector would need to be factored in.
Progress in the manufacturing industry and building 
sectors is limited and raises concerns about the feasibility 
of achieving its mid-range potential by 2020. For the 
manufacturing industry current uptake of energy-efficient 
technology is moderate according to the International 
Energy Agency (IEA,  2013). However, large developing 
countries such as China and India now have substantial 
industrial energy efficiency programmes in place, although 
the actual impact of these is difficult to quantify at this 
stage. Given the limited level of implementation globally, the 
remaining potential in 2020 is likely to be closer to the lower 
end of the range rather than the higher. Since a large part of 
the potential is retrofit and add-on technology, the estimate 
of the 2030 potential is probably still valid. The building 
sector shows limited progress, according to Ürge-Vorsatz et 
al. (2012) and the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2013), 
who claim that a large untapped potential exists. This raises 
concern about the feasibility of reaching the 2020 potentials 
and also makes it difficult to make a statement about the 
change in potential for 2030.
Similarly for agriculture and forestry, the limited level of 
actual implementation of policies may limit the feasibility to 
achieve the higher ends of the range of emission reduction 
potentials for 2020.
To conclude, the findings of recent studies are generally 
consistent with the range of 2020 emission reduction 
potentials summarised in Table 6.1. However, they do 
give reason for concern about the feasibility of achieving 
the potentials by 2020. They also illustrate the need for 
comprehensive updates of the potentials for each sector for 
2020 and 2030, and for tracking progress towards them. 
Most of all, this section, along with the previous chapters 
of this report, illustrates that emission reduction potentials 
will only be realised if strong, long-term and sector-specific 
policies and policy portfolios are in place at the international 
and national level (Box 6.1).
6.3 Options to narrow and potentially bridge 
the emissions gap in 2020
A number of options to narrow the 2020 emissions gap 
can be identified based on the information of the previous 
chapters of this report. These range from applying more 
stringent accounting practices for pledges to increasing the 
scope of pledges to going beyond them. Figure 6.1 summarizes 
these options and illustrates how, if implemented together, 
they have the potential to bridge the emissions gap in 2020. 
Each of these options and their potential contribution to 
narrowing the emissions gap are summarised below.
As described in Chapter 2, the gap can be narrowed by 
1-2 GtCO
2
e by applying more stringent accounting practices 
for emission reduction pledges, i.e. by moving from lenient 
to strict rules. This includes:
-	 Minimizing the use of lenient land-use credits                        .
-	 Minimizing the use of surplus emission units
-	 Avoid double counting of offsets 
The gap can be further narrowed by 2-3 GtCO
2
e if all 
countries were to move from their unconditional to their 
more ambitious conditional pledges. This would require 
the fulfilment of the conditions on those pledges and the 
swift implementation of policies to deliver the additional 
reductions. These conditions include expected action of 
other countries as well as the provision of adequate financing, 
technology transfer and capacity building. Alternatively it 
would imply that conditions for some countries be relaxed 
or removed.
These two approaches, applying more stringent accounting 
practices plus implementing the more ambitious pledges, 
leads to a reduction of the emissions gap of 4 GtCO
2
e.
The gap can be further narrowed by other actions aimed 
at increasing the scope of current pledges:
-	 Coverage of all emissions in national pledges (up to 
0.5 GtCO
2
e): some country pledges cover only a part of 
a country’s total emissions. For example some countries 
have pledges to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and 
have not specified actions for the other greenhouse 
gases. This would apply to roughly 3 GtCO
2
e of current 
emissions. Assuming these are reduced by 15 percent 
____________________
3 Some countries are set to move in this direction (see Section 2.5)
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Box 6.1 Best-practice policies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and achieving development goals from the 2012 
and 2013 UNEP emissions gap reports
The 2012 and 2013 UNEP emission gap reports identify policies for four sectors that have proven successful in 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions in many different countries, while contributing to national development 
goals (Chapter 4; UNEP, 2012). Such sector-specific policies have the potential to make a significant contribution 
to bridging the gap, if scaled up in both ambition and geographical reach. 
Agriculture
– Promotion of no-tillage practices: no-till refers to direct seeding under the mulch layer of the previous season’s crop, 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions from soil disturbances and fossil-fuel use by farm machinery.
– Improved nutrient and water management in rice production: includes innovative cropping practices such as alternate 
wetting and drying and urea deep placement that reduce methane and nitrous oxide emissions.
– Agroforestry: consists of different agricultural management practices that all deliberately include woody perennials 
on farms and the landscape, and which promote a greater uptake of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere by biomass 
and soils. 
Buildings 
These policies lower energy use and therefore reduce carbon-dioxide and other emissions:
– Building codes: regulatory instruments that set standards for specific technologies or energy performance levels and 
that can be applied to both new buildings and retrofits of existing buildings.
– Appliance standards: regulations that prescribe the energy performance of manufactured products, sometimes 
prohibiting the sale of products that are below a minimum level of efficiency.
– Appliance labels: energy-efficiency labels that are fixed to manufactured products to describe the products’ energy 
performance. Endorsement labels are seals of approval that are awarded if energy-saving criteria are met. Comparative 
labels allow consumers to compare performance among similar products.
Forests
These policies slow down deforestation and thereby reduce carbon dioxide and other emissions:
– Protected areas: designating some forested areas as protected areas.
– Command-and-control measures: enacting and enforcing environmental regulations and putting adequate monitoring 
systems in place to ensure compliance.
– Economic instruments: using economic tools such as taxes, subsidies, and payments for ecosystem services for 
encouraging forest conservation.
Transport 
These policies reduce energy use and therefore reduce carbon dioxide and other emissions:
– Transit-oriented development: the practice of mixing residential, commercial and recreational land uses to promote 
high-density neighbourhoods around public transit stations.
– Bus Rapid Transit (BRT): key elements of bus rapid transit include frequent, high-capacity service; higher operating 
speeds than conventional buses; separated lanes; distinct stations with level boarding; and fare prepayment and 
unique branding.
– Vehicle performance standards: establish minimum requirements based on fuel consumption or greenhouse gas 
emissions per unit of distance travelled by certain vehicle classes. 
These policies do not represent a comprehensive list. Moreover, some best-practice policies will be more appropriate 
and successful in reducing emissions in some countries than in others. Their success also depends on how stringently 
they are implemented.
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Reductions of short-lived climate pollutants would have 
to occur in addition to reductions of emissions of long-
lived greenhouse gases, and would not be a replacement. 
Some ozone precursors and black carbon are not covered by 
national pledges, but are already assumed to be reduced in 
the calculations of the gap. Missing out on these reductions 
would increase the gap by a rough equivalent of 1–2 GtCO
2
e 
(Hare et al., 2012; UNEP, 2011b).
6.4 Conclusions
This chapter illustrates that it is difficult to estimate 
the impact of various options for reducing emissions and 
narrowing the gap. For this reason it would be beneficial to 
set up an objective accounting system for tracking progress 
towards closing the gap. Also, comprehensive updates of 
emission reduction potentials in different sectors would 
provide invaluable information for decision making as we 
move closer to 2020.
Importantly, this chapter shows that applying more 
stringent accounting practices, implementing more 
ambitious pledges, and increasing the scope of current 
pledges, will bring the world halfway to bridging the gap. 
The remaining gap can be bridged through further national 
and international action, including international cooperative 
initiatives. As shown in the beginning of this chapter this is 
technically possible.
Figure 6.1 Overview of options to narrow the emissions gap in 2020.
by 2020, the order of magnitude of pledges made by 
other countries, the resulting reduction would be 
0.5 GtCO
2
e.
-	 New pledges by countries that have not yet pledged 
(up to 1 GtCO
2
e): some countries have not yet put 
forward pledges. Aggregated emission levels from 
those countries amounted to roughly 7 GtCO
2
e in 2010. 
If they were to reduce emissions by 15 percent by 2020, 
which is the order of magnitude of pledges made by 
other countries, the resulting reduction in emissions 
would be 1 GtCO
2
e.
-	 Additional reductions from sectors not covered by 
national pledges (0.3 GtCO
2
e): Some sectors, notably 
international transport, are not covered by national 
pledges. The mitigation potential in these sectors is 
0.3 GtCO
2
e (UNEP, 2011a). 
These three actions to increase the scope of current 
pledges would further reduce the gap by up to 1.8 GtCO
2
e.
Adding together the more stringent accounting practices, 
the more ambitious pledges, and the increased scope of 
current pledges, reduces the gap by around 6 GtCO
2
e, or 
about a half.
The remaining gap can be bridged through further national 
and international action, including international cooperative 
initiatives. These initiatives may partly overlap with national 
pledges, but can also be additional to these pledges. If they 
are additional and implemented rapidly, they have the 
potential to substantially reduce the gap by 2020 (Blok et 
al., 2012).
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